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NOTES
SEX-BASED WAGE DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII:
EQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK OR EQUAL PAY FOR
COMPARABLE WORK?
The number of women entering the labor force has risen steadily
during the past half-century,1 but women have not achieved wage
equality with their male colleagues in the workplace.2 After many
years of abortive legislative efforts,3 Congress enacted two statutes
now used to remedy sex-based wage discrimination: the Equal Pay
Act of 19634 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 5 The Equal Pay Act,
1. In 1978, 50% of all women in the U.S. were employed in labor outside their homes.
Herman, Progress and Problems for Working Women, 30 LAB. L.J. 195, 195 (1979). See W.
CHAFE, THE AMERICAN WOMAN; CHANGING SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ROLES, 1920-
1970 (1972); Gitt & Gelb, Beyond the Equal Pay Act: Expanding Wage Differential Protec-
tions Under Title VII, 8 Loy. Cm. L.J. 723 (1977).
2. "Whether from overt discrimination or from the socialization process of a male-domi-
nated culture, the job market is inhospitable to the women seeking any but the lowest paid
jobs." Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 353 (1974).
"For example, in 1953 the average salary for fulltime working women was sixty-three per-
cent of the salaries of fulltime men workers. By 1973 the average salary of fulltime women
workers was only fifty-seven percent of fulltime working men average salary." Gitt & Gelb,
supra note 1, at 723.
"Yet 35 percent of all working women have clerical jobs, while only about 5 percent are in
mid-management jobs and less than 1 percent are counted as top management. . . ." Levy,
'Comparable Worth' May Be Rights Issue of '80s, Washington Post, Oct. 13, 1980, (Wash-
ington Business) at 20, col. 3.
"Women-who account for 42 percent of the work force-today earn 59 cents for every $1
men earn, goverment statistics show. Twenty-five years ago, it was 64 cents for every $1."
Levy, supra note 1, at 3, col. 2. "The average female college graduate... makes $2000 less
a year than the average male high school dropout." Id. at 20, col. 3.
See also U.S. BuREAu OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR EMPLOYMENT AND
EARNINGS, HOUSEHOLD DATA ANNUAL AvERAGES (January 1980); WOMEN'S BUREAu, DEPART-
MENT OF LABOR, FULLY EMPLOYED WOMEN CoNTINUE TO EARN LESS THAN FULLY EMPLOYED
MEN OF EITHER RACE 88-93 (August 1978).
3. Gitt & Gelb, supra note 1, at 724.
4. Pub. L. No. 88-38, § 3, 77 Stat. 56 (1963) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976)).
5. Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e to 2000e-16 (1976)).
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an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,6 prohibits
employers from paying sex-based wage differentials to individuals
performing the "same" jobs.7 Congress designed the Equal Pay Act
to enforce a policy of equal pay for equal -work. Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act, a broad-based prohibition of a variety of discrimi-
natory practices, prohibits discrimination based on sex with re-
spect to "compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employ-
ment. . .. "8
Until recently the courts failed to delineate the scope of each
statute with respect to the congressional aim of eliminating sex-
based wage discrimination. Moreover, neither Congress nor the
courts defined the appropriate relationship between the statutes.
The Bennett Amendment,9 an addition to Title VII, was Congress'
sole attempt to explicate the relationship between the two laws;
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976). The Equal Pay Act's coverage is generally coextensive
with the coverage of the minimum wage provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FISA).
H.R. REP. No. 309, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in [1963] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 687, 688.
Until the Reorganization Act of 1978, the U.S. Department of Labor administered and
enforced the Equal Pay Act as an amendment to the FLSA. The stated purpose of Labor
Department enforcement was to eliminate "the need for a new bureaucratic structure to
enforce equal pay legislation; ... compliance should be made easier because both industry
and labor have a long established familiarity with existing fair labor standards provisions."
H.R. REP. No. 309, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1963), reprinted in [1963] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. Naws 687, 688.
In analyzing any FLSA case, once one determines that coverage exists, one must examine
the numerous exceptions to the FLSA to determine whether the respondent is exempt.
Since passage of the Educdtion Amendments of 1972, however, the FLSA's exemption for
executive, administrative, and professional employees has not applied to the equal pay
provisions.
Because proving pay discrimination with respect to professionals is more difficult than
proving such discrimination with respect to blue collar workers, courts have been reluctant
to enforce the Act in white collar occupations. See Molthan v. Temple Univ., 442 F. Supp.
448 (E.D. Pa. 1977). See also A. Waintroob, The Developing Law of Equal Opportunity at
the White Collar and Professional Level, 21 WM. & MARY L. REv. 45 (1979).
In most instances, even though the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the FLSA
do not apply to state and local governments, the Equal Pay Act does apply to state and
local governments. See Pearce v. Wichita County, 590 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1979); Christopher
v. Iowa, 559 F.2d 1135 (8th Cir. 1977); Usery v. Charleston County School Dist., 558 F.2d
1169 (4th Cir. 1977).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976). Case law has refined the determination of what constitutes
the same jobs. See notes 36-46 & accompanying text infra.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976). For the full text of the Bennett Amendment, see text
accompanying note 163 infra.
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unfortunately it did not clarify the ambiguities present in the
legislation.
The Bennett Amendment, 0 a floor amendment," provides that
an employer may pay his employees different wages based on gen-
der, if the provisions of the Equal Pay Act authorize such differen-
tiation.12 The Equal Pay Act authorizes differences in pay to men
and women when they perform "equal woRK," if such payment falls
into one of four enumerated exceptions-" (i) a seniority system;
(ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by
quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on
any other factor other than sex."13 The Bennett Amendment,
therefore, incorporates provisions of the Equal Pay Act into Title
VII. After the amendment's enactment, the courts had to deter-
mine whether all provisions of the Equal Pay Act, or only the four
enumerated exceptions, now constituted part of Title VII.
Congress' intention on this issue remains obscure because one
plausibly can construe the Bennett Amendment to relate the
Equal Pay Act and Title VII in either of two ways. One can read
the amendment narrowly as an expression of congressional intent
that the Equal Pay Act be the sole standard for finding sex-based
wage discrimination.14 If so interpreted, the statute ensures that
the reach of Title VII is coextensive with that of the Equal Pay
Act,15 and consequently confines litigation of sex-based wage dis-
crimination claims to the equal pay for equal work formula. Thus,
a plaintiff must show that her employer's conduct violated the
equal work standard of the Equal Pay Act in order to prove sex-
based wage discrimination under Title VII. The payment of un-
equal wages to men and women performing comparable but un-
10. Id.
11. 110 CONG. REC. 13,647 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Bennett).
12. Id.
13. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976).
14. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in IUE v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 588, 592 (3d Cir. 1980), characterized this position as
the narrow interpretation of the Bennett Amendment. The interpretation is narrow in the
sense that it limits the scope of Title VII to that of the Equal Pay Act: Conversely, the
"broad interpretation" of the Bennett Amendment refers to the broad coverage of Title VII
over various types of sex discrimination claims, beyond the confines of the Equal Pay Act.
15. Gunther v. County of Wash., 602 F.2d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 49
U.S.L.W. 3332 (1980) (No. 80-429).
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equal work would not violate either statute.16
If read broadly, the Bennett Amendment only incorporates the
four exceptions to the equal pay for equal work standard of the
Equal Pay Act into Title VII.17 Under this interpretation, plaintiffs
could present a sex-based wage discrimination claim under Title
VII without proving that the jobs undergoing comparison were
equal. Therefore, under Title VII, courts would permit plaintiffs to
prove that an employer intentionally discriminated on the basis of
sex by showing that the employer paid women workers less than
males in differing jobs because of gender, and not because of the
less valuable nature of their labor. 8 This standard sometimes is
called "equal pay for comparable work."'19
In 1979, the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit addressed the issues of interpretation of the Equal Pay Act,
Title VII, and the Bennett Amendment. The district court in IUE
v. Westinghouse20 approved the narrow interpretation of the Ben-
nett Amendment, concluding that the Equal Pay Act expresses
congressional policy in the limited area of sex-based wage differen-
tials. Title VII merely provides an alternative procedural device for
enforcing the same standard: equal pay for equal work. 21 In con-
trast, the Ninth Circuit in Gunther v. County of Washington22
16. IUE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 450, 453 (D.N.J. 1979),
rev'd, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 588 (3d Cir. 1980).
17. IUE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 588, 592 (3d Cir. 1980).
18. Gunther v. County of Wash., 602 F.2d 882, 891 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 49
U.S.L.W. 3332 (1980) (No. 80-429); IUE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 23 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 588, 590 (3d Cir. 1980).
19. See Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation, and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 12 U. MICH. J.L. RF. 397 (1979); Nelson, Opton & Wilson, Wage Dis-
crimination and the "Comparable Worth" Theory in Perspective, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 233
(1980).
20. IUE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 450, 453 (D.N.J. 1979),
rev'd, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 588 (3d Cir. 1980).
21. Id. Title VII has been used generally as a supplement or substitute for the Equal Pay
Act when jurisdictional or relief restrictions of the Fair Labor Standards Act would limit
recovery under the Equal Pay Act. See, e.g., Howard v. Ward County, 12 Empl. Prac. Dec.
5790 (D.N.D. 1976); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1382 (D.D.C. 1974);
Frobig v. Held Warehouse & Transp. Co., 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5264 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). For
extensive discussion of the differing coverage of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII, see notes
176-180 & accompanying text infra.
22. 602 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3332 (1980) (No. 80-429).
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adopted the broad interpretation of the Bennett Amendment. The
court held that the congressional intention to eliminate all forms of
sex-based wage differentials demands an interpretation that Title
VII and the Equal Pay Act. are complementary but independent
solutions to the same problem.2 3
Prior to Gunther, courts had not seized upon Title VII to fash-
ion relief beyond the substantive parameters of the Equal Pay Act
in the area of sex-based wage differentials.2 4 Sex-based wage dis-
crimination claims arising under Title VII involved "substantially
equal" jobs as defined by the Equal Pay Act; accordingly, in Title
VII cases courts examined claims of "unequal pay for equal work."
The Ninth Circuit in Gunther was the first court of appeals to
hold that the scope of Title VII exceeds that of the Equal Pay
Act."
A plethora of cases raising similar issues followed in the wake of
the Gunther decision, the most notable being the Third Circuit's
reversal of the district court in IUE v. Westinghouse.26 The Third
Circuit's decision in IUE propounded many of the arguments first
addressed in Gunther but articulated them at greater length and
with increased clarity.27
23. Id. at 889.
24. See, e.g., Orr v. Frank R. MacNeill & Son, Inc., 511 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1975); Ammons
v. Zia Co., 448 F.2d 117 (10th Cir. 1971); IUE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 19 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 450 (D.N.J. 1979), rev'd, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 588 (3d Cir. 1980); Wetzel v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 449 F. Supp. 397 (W.D. Pa. 1978); Molthan v. Temple Univ. 442 F.
Supp. 448 (E.D. Pa. 1977); EEOC v. Colby College, 439 F. Supp. 631 (D. Me. 1977); Howard
v. Ward Co., 418 F. Supp. 494 (D.N.D. 1976).
25. 602 F.2d at 891. Moreover, in denying a rehearing en banc to the appellants in Gun-
ther, the Ninth Circuit reemphasized its belief that the Bennett Amendment expands Title
VII beyond the Equal Pay Act. Gunther v. County of Wash., 623 F.2d 1317, 1319 (9th Cir.
1980) (petition for rehearing denied).
26. 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 588 (3d Ci. 1980).
27. The primary defect in the Third Circuit's opinion was the court's failure to grapple
with the practical policy issues implicated by the broad interpretation of the Bennett
Amendment. Under that interpretation, a plaintiff can allege that her salary is less than
that of other employees solely because of her gender. The court then will have to compare
the differing types of work to see whether the wage differential is related to job content or
results from discriminatory intent. The discriminatory intent need not be the predominant
reason for the wage differential in order to make out a violation, but may be merely part of
the motivation of the employer. Cf. King v. Laborer's Local 818, 443 F.2d 273, 279 (6th Cir.
1971) (showing of discrimination as a causal factor in discharge or refusal to hire renders
employer liable in damages).
Arguably, the courts cannot competently or efficiently compare job content. The dissent
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Both the Third and Ninth Circuits recognized that deficiencies
in the present laws have hampered congressional efforts to elimi-
nate sex-based wage discrimination. Traditionally, victims of dis-
crimination in employment had only two options, to pursue a claim
under Title VII for discrimination in hiring, promotion, or benefits,
or to seek to enforce the literal terms of the Equal Pay Act. Ideally
enforcement of these laws would expand women's entry into for-
merly male-dominated occupations and raise their level of compen-
sation to parity with that of their fraternal colleagues. 28 Unfortu-
nately employers exploited the loopholes 29 present in the statutes
in order to lower labor costs. Subtle forms of discrimination devel-
oped that plagued female participants in the labor force.30 The
Third and Ninth Circuits believed that by expanding Title VII
they could provide injured parties with a practical remedy with
which to vindicate their rights.31
Moreover, the Third Circuit embraced a "broad interpretation"
of the Bennett Amendment because it could not justify the appli-
cation of stricter standards of scrutiny for racial discrimination
than sexual discrimination. 2 Under the narrow interpretation of
the Bennett Amendment, courts could not eliminate intentional
in IUE stressed this very point in its criticism of the majority. 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at
600 (Van Dusen, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the policy implications of the compara-
ble work standard, see text accompanying notes 300-316 infra.
28. See generally A. REES & G. SCHULTZ, WORKERS AND WAGES IN AN URBAN LABOR MAR-
KEr (1970).
The Supreme Court has recognized that the Equal Pay Act was essential because women
have weaker bargaining power with respect to wages. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417
U.S. 188, 207 (1974). Thus, women's willingness to work for less than is appropriate in light
of the job content does not justify underpayment of women. Although women as a group
command little bargaining power because women are competing for so few jobs, the em-
ployer and the union ought not benefit from the discrimination made possible by lack of
bargaining power. See also Kanowitz, Sex-based Discrimination in American Law III: Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 305
(1968).
29. For a discussion of the loopholes in the pre-Gunther legal framework, see notes 46-50
& accompanying text infra.
30. For a discussion of subtle forms of discrimination, see note 312 infra.
31. IUE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 23 Fair EmpL Prac. Cas. 588, 592 (3d Cir. 1980);
Gunther v. County of Wash., 602 F.2d 882, 890 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W.
3332 (1980) (No. 80-429).
32. See IUE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 588, 590 (3d Cir.
1980).
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sex-based wage discrimination if the jobs in question were not sub-
stantially the same. For example, an action by an employer to de-
liberately place blacks'in certain jobs and then fix their salaries
fifteen percent below the preexisting wage level obviously would
violate Title VIII.3 Under the pre-Gunther approach, the court
could not scrutinize sex-based wage discrimination unless the jobs
were equal. Thus with similar facts, the employer would escape lia-
bility if the discrimination were sexually based rather than racially
based. The Third Circuit maintained that the proper interpreta-
tion of the Bennett Amendment would treat sex discrimination as
equally invidious as racial discrimination and as meriting the same
determination to eliminate both forms of illegal action from Amer-
ican employment practices.3"
This Note supports the argument implicit in IUE that a distinc-
tion between racial discrimination and sexual discrimination under
Title VII is not only logically indefensible, but is clearly in conflict
with the congressional intention to eliminate all incidents of sex
discrimination from Amerian society. A thorough examination of
the statutory construction and legislative histories of the Bennett
Amendment, Title VII, and the Equal Pay Act, as well as the ad-
ministrative guidelines and case law on these issues, clearly sup-
ports the Third and Ninth Circuit's interpretation of congressional
intentions.
This Note will analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the
equal-pay-for-comparable-work approach to sex-based wage dis-
crimination as articulated by the Third and Ninth Circuits. Al-
though the Third Circuit's narrow holding in .IUE does not go so
far as the Ninth Circuit's emphasis on Title VII's broad coverage
over equal pay for comparable work claims, the two courts agree
generally on the need for an interpretation of the Bennett Amend-
ment and Title VII that facilitates a judicially-led attack against
intentional sex discrimination in employment practices. The con-
clusions of the Ninth Circuit in Gunther and the Third Circuit in
IUE represent a new trend in the adjudication of sex-discrimina-
tion claims.
33. See Quarles v. Phillip Morris Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 509-10 (E.D. Va. 1968).
34. IUE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 588, 590, 592-93 (3d Cir.
1980).
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THE EQUAL PAY ACT
In the early 1960's, Congress desired to eliminate sex-based wage
discrimination from American society. The Equal Pay Act of 1963
was the first legislation directly addressing the problem. A prima
facie violation of the Act occurs when the plaintiff shows that two
employees of different sexes, in the same establishment, are receiv-
ing unequal pay for work that is substantially equal.3 5
The first important case interpreting the terms of the Equal Pay
Act, Schultz v. Wheaton Glass Co.," established that "equal
work" means "job content" that is substantially equal, but not
identical, so as not to destroy the remedial purposes of the Act.37 A
number of other courts have adopted this standard,3 8 and the Su-
preme Court has approved it implicitly. 9 Additionally, the Depart-
35. See, e.g., Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974); Gunther v.
County of Wash., 602 F.2d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3332 (1980)
(No. 80-429); Brennan v. Prince William Hsp. Corp., 503 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 972 (1975); Schultz v. American Can Co.-Dixie Prods., 424 F.2d 356 (8th
Cir. 1970).
The relevant text of the Act reads as follows:
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall
discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed,
between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such
establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees
of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the perform-
ance of which requires equal skill, effort, responsibility, and which are per-
formed under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made
pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which mea-
sures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based
on any other factor other than sex: Provided, That an employer who is paying
a wage rate differential shall not, in order to comply with the provisions of this
subsection, reduce the wage rate of any employee.
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976).
36. 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970).
37. Id. at 265.
38. Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1086 (1978); Usery v. Allegheny County Inst. Dist., 544 F.2d 148, 153 (2d Cir. 1976);
Peltier v. City of Fargo, 533 F.2d 374, 377 (8th Cir. 1976); Brennan v. Owensboro-Davies
County Hosp., 523 F.2d 1013, 1031 (6th Cir. 1975); Hodgson v. Behrens Drug Co., 475 F.2d
1041, 1049 (5th Cir. 1973); Hodgson v. Miller Brewing Co., 457 F.2d 221, 227 (7th Cir. 1972).
39. See Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974). In Brennan, the Supreme
Court indirectly approved the Wheaton standard, saying, "it is now well settled that jobs
need not be identical in every respect before the Equal Pay Act is applicable . . "Id. at
203 n.24.
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ment of Labor 40 has specified that the standard for comparing jobs
cannot rest simply on job titles or classifications, but must depend
upon an evaluation of actual performance of tasks;41 the overall
job, not its individual segments, forms the basis of the
comparison. 42
The courts have had difficulty in applying the "substantially
equal" test to employment situations.43 They have tended to focus
on distinctions and comparisons cited by the litigants on a case-by-
case basis rather than on any consistent principles or indicia of
"substantial equality."'44 The courts have recognized that job con-
tent rather than job description is controlling.4 The emphasis on
job content stemmed from judicial and legislative concern that em-
ployers would manipulate job evaluations to their economic
advantage.46
The "Establishment" Requirement
The Equal Pay Act provides for the payment of equal pay for
equal work by both sexes in the same establishment.47 The defini-
40. Until the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) promulgated new in-
terpretive guidelines, the regulations of the Wage and Hour Administrator provided guid-
ance for employers and employees regarding Equal Pay Act standards. H.R. REP. No. 309,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in [1963] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 687, 688-91.
41. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 800.121-.123 (1979). See also Krumbeck v. John Oster Mfg. Co., 313
F. Supp. 257, 259-60, 261, 262 (E.D. Wis. 1970) (actual duties, not employer job rating sys-
tem, control under the Equal Pay Act).
42. Usery v. Richman, 558 F.2d 1318, 1320 (8th Cir. 1977). Judicial decisions have rein-
forced the Labor Department standards for evaluating discrimination. See, e.g., Hodgson v.
Behrens Drug Co., 475 F.2d 1041, 1049 (5th Cir. 1973); Hodgson v. Miller Brewing Co., 547
F.2d 221, 227 (7th Cir. 1972); Hodgson v. Fairmont Supply Co., 454 F.2d 490, 493 (4th Cir.
1972); Schultz v. American Can Co.-Dixie Prods., 424 F.2d 356, 360 (8th Cir. 1970); Schultz
v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970).
43. See Hodgson v. Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 470 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1972); Hodgson v.
Golden Isles Convalescent Homes, Inc., 468 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1972).
44. See Brennan v. Prince William Hosp. Corp., 503 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. de-
nied, 420 U.S. 972 (1975).
45. See Brennan v. Victoria Bank and Trust Co., 493 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1974).
46. The House recognized in hearings and on the floor that employers could evade the
Equal Pay Act by firing all female employees, refusing to hire them, or segregating them so
that they did not perform the same work as men. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 3861, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess., 145-47 (1963) (statement of John G. Wayman); id. at 232-35 (statement of
Ezra G. Hester); id. at 96-105 (statement of S. Herbert Unteberger). See generally 110
CONG. REc. 2579-82 (1964).
47. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976).
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tion of establishment determines the kind of business organization
that will be the unit of comparison in evaluating job content. If an
employer does not discriminate within a particular establishment,
he does not violate the Act.4' In recognition of the statute's loop-
holes, courts have attempted to eliminate the employer's ability to
infringe upon the spirit and to circumvent the goals of the Equal
Pay Act. In some test cases, the courts have interpreted the mean-
ing of "establishment" flexibly in order to fulfill the Act's overrid-
ing purpose, the elimination of wage discrimination. In Brennan v.
Goose Creek Consolidated Independent School District,49 for ex-
ample, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held that although male and female janitors worked in different
school buildings, the school district as a whole was the relevant
functional unit for establishment purposes.50
Equal Pay Act Standards
The plaintiff's initial burden of proof is to demonstrate substan-
tial equality, based on similarity of skill, effort, and responsibility,
between jobs performed under similar working conditions. Courts
generally consider skill, effort, and responsibility to constitute
three separate tests and hence prerequisites to the applicability of
equal pay sanctions.51
Neither the Equal Pay Act nor the Fair Labor Standards Act defines the term "establish-
ment." The Department of Labor's Interpretive Bulletin on the Equal Pay Act suggests that
the generally accepted understanding of an "establishment" is a "physically separate place
of business, rather than an entire business enterprise which may include many distinct
places of business." 29 C.F.R. § 800.108 (1979).
48. For example, as one commentator has noted, "the EPA would perimit an employer to
establish a new facility across the street from his present one, place the women employees in
the new facility and continue sex-based wage differentials with impunity .... " Kanowitz,
Sex-based Discrimination in American Law III: Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and
the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 20 HAsTINGs L.J. 305, 349 (1968).
49. 519 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1975).
50. Id. at 56, 58.
51. The Supreme Court set out the elements of an Equal Pay Act case in Corning Glass
Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974).
The Act's basic structure and operation are . . . straightforward. In order to
make out a case under the Act, the Secretary must show that an employer pays
different wages to employees of opposite sexes "for equal work on jobs the
performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which
are performed under similar working conditions."
Id. at 195 (citations omitted).
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The Secretary of Labor has defined skill as experience, training,
education, and ability.2 A finding that two or more employees of
opposite sex are unequal in terms of skills and training does not
settle the issue whether the jobs are substantially equal. The cru-
cial question is not whether employees of one sex possess addi-
tional training or skills, but whether the nature of the duties actu-
ally performed requires or utilizes those additional skills."
The majority of Equal Pay Act cases that have involved blue
collar and nonprofessional workers turn primarily upon the ques-
tion of equality of effort." Equal effort is equivalent physical or
mental exertion.55 Extra tasks may support a wage differential if
they create significant variations in skill, effort, or responsibility
between otherwise equal jobs.5 In Hodgson v. Brookhaven General
Hospital,57 the Fifth Circuit discussed the equality of effort test:
Jobs do not entail equal effort, even though they entail most of
the same routine duties, if the more highly paid job involves ad-
ditional tasks which (1) require extra effort, (2) consume a sig-
nificant amount of the time of all those whose pay differentials
are to be justified in terms of them, and (3) are of an economic
value commensurate with the pay differential.5
Employers could exploit the "extra effort" standard by assigning
additional, but insignificant duties to "male jobs" solely to justify
As Corning indicates, under the Equal Pay Act, plaintiff need not prove discriminatory
intent. Indeed, a finding that an employer acted in good faith in an Equal Pay Act case
merely would permit the employer to escape liability for statutory liquidated damages.
Good faith would not undercut a finding of a violation. See 29 U.S.C. § 260 (1976).
52. 29 C.F.R. § 800.125 (1979).
53. Peltier v. City of Fargo, 533 F.2d 374, 377 (8th Cir. 1976).
54. See, e.g., Brennan v. Prince William Hosp. Corp., 503 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 972 (1975); Hodgson v. Miller Brewing Co., 457 F.2d 221, 227 (7th Cir.
1972); Hodgson v. Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 436 F.2d 719, 725 (5th Cir. 1970); Schultz v.
Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970); Schultz v.
American Can Co.-Dixie Prods., 424 F.2d 356, 360 (8th Cir. 1970).
55. 29 C.F.R. §§ 800.127-.128 (1979).
56. See Hodgson v. Fairmont Supply Co., 454 F.2d 490, 493-94 (4th Cir. 1972) (additional
tasks performed by males do not justify wage discrepancy between male and female stock
desk clerks; Equal Pay Act requires equal not identical work); Schultz v. Saxonburg Ceram-
ics, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 1139, 1146 (W.D. Pa. 1970) (restriction of female employees' physical
activity that results in slight addition to male workload does not justify wage differential).
57. 436 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1970).
58. Id. at 725.
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the payment of wage differentials. The courts have recognized the
dubious validity of this justification. In Laffey v. Northwest Air-
lines, 9 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia held that an employer must show a consistent pattern of
performance of additional duties to demonstrate that the added
duties are the motivating factor for paying persons of one sex more
than persons of the other sex.60 The vague definitions of equal skill
and equal effort allow the courts flexibility in determining job
equality.
In comparison with the equal effort cases, relatively few cases
have isolated the equal responsibility criterion. Equal responsibil-
ity hinges on an evaluation of the degree of accountability required
in performance of the job, with emphasis placed on the importance
of the job obligation.6 1 The Labor Department has promulgated in-
terpretations of the Equal Pay Act standards, including responsi-
bility, giving examples of differences of responsibility that would
justify a pay differential. For example, if some sales persons may
determine whether to accept personal checks and others may not,
the responsibilities of the workers are dissimilar.2
Similarly, the equal pay principle does not apply in a compari-
son of employees who perform otherwise equal jobs under dissimi-
lar working conditions. The Act does not require that working con-
ditions be "equal" but only that they be "similar."6 The
administrative interpretation notes that "slight or inconsequential
differences in working conditions that are essentially similar would
not justify a differential in pay."'" In Corning Glass Works v.
Brennan,65 the Supreme Court construed the term "working condi-
tions" to encompass the physical surroundings and hazards of a
job, 6 but not the time of day worked.67 The kinds of working con-
ditions that form the basis of wage differentials must be those usu-
59. 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 720 (1978).
60. Id. at 450. See also Peltier v. City of Fargo, 533 F.2d 374, 377 (8th Cir. 1976).
61. 29 C.F.R. §§ 800.129-.130 (1979).
62. Id.
63. 29 C.F.R. § 80.132 (1979).
64. Id.
65. 417 U.S. 188 (1974).
66. Id. at 202.
67. Id. at 202-05.
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ally considered in the industrial evaluation of job compensation. 8
A plaintiff must fulfill several conditions, then, before the plain-
tiff can successfully litigate a claim under the Equal Pay Act: the
job content must be substantially equal; that is, the job must re-
quire equal skill, effort, and responsibility under similar working
conditions. Once the plaintiff sustains his burden of proof, the bur-
den shifts to the employer to show that the differential falls within
one of the Act's exceptions. Thus the employer's burden to demon-
strate that the differential falls within an exception constitutes an
affirmative defense.
Equal Pay Act Exceptions
After a court evaluates the jobs to determine their substantial
equality, the court must determine the applicability of one of the
four exceptions permitting wage differentials. To qualify for the
exceptions, the wage differentials between workers may not depend
in any way on sex."' The first exception or affirmative defense
specifies that seniority is an acceptable basis for wage differentials
between workers.70 Second, a merit system justifies wage differen-
tials if the system applies equally to employees of both sexes.71
The third valid wage differential is one paid pursuant to a system
that measures earnings by quantity or quality or production, such
as a piece-work system.72 The last and most comprehensive of the
four exceptions allows differentials based on "any other factor
other than sex, '7 3 such as training programs74 or special economic
68. 29 C.F.R. §§ 800.131-.133 (1979).
69. 29 C.F.R. §§ 800.142-.143 (1979).
70. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976); 29 C.F.R. §§ 800.144-.145 (1979).
71. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976); 29 C.F.R. §§ 800.144-.145 (1979).
72. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976); 29 C.F.R. §§ 800.144-.145 (1979).
73. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976); 29 C.F.R. §§ 800.144-.145 (1979). See also Homer v.
Mary Inst., 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1069 (8th Cir. 1980) (employer's perception that wo-
men generally will work for less than will men is not justification for paying women less, but
the employer may consider marketplace value of skills of individuals when determining
salaries).
74. 29 C.F.R. § 800.148 (1979). In some cases arising under the Act, the jobs are equal,
but the employer alleges that the difference in pay arises from a bona fide training program.
In general, a bona fide training program must have substance and significance independent
of a trainee's regular job. See Hodgson v. Behrens Drug Co., 475 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 822 (1973); Hodgson v. Security Nat'I Bank, 460 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1972)
(training program must be available to both sexes). The training program of a small com-
19811
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:421
benefit to the employer. 5
The breadth of this final category has led most courts to con-
strue it narrowly to prevent employers from masking sex-based
wage differentials.76 For example, in Schultz v. First Victoria Na-
tional Bank,77 the Fifth Circuit stated that the "market force" the-
ory, that women will work for less than men, is not a valid basis for
a wage differential under the Equal Pay Act's fourth exception. 8
Under the Equal Pay Act, employers may not justify wage differ-
entials on the basis of sex stereotypes. 9
TITLE VII STANDARDS
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.80 The broad nature of the statute, addressing hiring, promo-
pany need not have been as elaborate as that of a large corporation, but the small size of the
corporation does not relieve it of the duty to establish a bona fide training program. See
Department of Labor's Intepretive Bulletin, 29 C.F.R. § 800.148 (1979).
75. 29 C.F.R. § 800.148 (1979). A clothing store paid saleswomen in the women's depart-
ment less than it paid men in the men's department, even though they performed equal
work under the statute, because the men's department was the more profitable of the two.
In Hodgson v. Robert Hall Clothes, Inc., the Third Circuit held that economic benefit to the
employer could be a "factor other than sex" on which to base a wage differential. 473 F.2d
589 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973).
76. The legislative history of the Equal Pay Act indicates that Congress did not intend
the exception "for any other factor other than sex" as a device to permit an employer to
evade the Act on the basis of some subjective, "uncommunicated reasons" regarding individ-
ual employees. Hodgson v. Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 436 F.2d 719, 725 (5th Cir. 1970).
77. 420 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1969).
78. Id. at 656-58.
79. 29 C.F.R. § 800.149 (1979). One example of sex stereotyping is the payment of higher
wages to "heads of households" when the employer recognizes only males as fitting into that
category.
80. Section 703(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976), reads as
follows:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em-
ployee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
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tion, and benefits, as well as compensation, indicated Congress' in-
tention to eliminate all forms of employment discrimination. Un-
like the strict categories of discrimination under the Equal Pay
Act, Title VII litigation devolves into two broad classifications of
employment discrimination: disparate treatment and disparate
impact."1
Disparate Treatment
Disparate treatment claims arise when members of a protected
class receive treatment different from other applicants or employ-
ees.8 2 A protected class is a racial, religious, or national group, or
one sex. An example of this type of discrimination would be an
employer who announces and follows a policy of refusing to hire
women for a particular job. An analagous example is an employer
who announces he pays women less than men because they do
merely "women's work." Such an announced policy of sex-based
wage payment is exceptional because an employer usually does not
articulate his discriminatory motive for his employment deci-
sions.83 Circumstantial evidence and factual inferences will serve as
the foundation for a discrimination claim. 4 In such cases, the
plaintiff must produce statistics showing the relative exclusion of
women from certain positions, or the failure to promote women, or
the payment of lower wages to women than to men.85 Other docu-
mentary and testimonial evidence as to the defendant's practices
and the experiences of individual applicants ought to corroborate
81. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)
(when plaintiffs' theory is one of disparate treatment, proof of intent is an essential element
of the claim). See also R. PEns, DFALING wrrH EMPLOYMENT DIsCRIMINATION 44-49 (1978).
82. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
See also R. PERES, supra note 81.
83. R. P.REs, supra note 81, at 44-45.
84. See Johnson v. University of Pittsburgh, 5 Empl. Prac. Dec. 8009 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
It is obvious that in a case of sex discrimination we very seldom find a resolu-
tion of a board of directors or a faculty committee agreeing to engage in sex
discrimination, any more than we would expect to find the same in a conspir-
acy to violate the antitrust laws. The existence of such discrimination must
therefore be found from circumstantial evidence and inferences from the
circumstances.
Id. at 8013.
85. R. PEREs, supra note 81, at 44-54.
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the statistics.8 6 Statistics alone rarely can prove discriminatory
practices, particularly in light of Title VII's attack on intentionally
discriminatory actions of the employer.8 7
In McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green,8 8 the Supreme Court es-
tablished that in order to prove a prima facie case of disparate
treatment of individuals, the Title VII plaintiff must show: (1) he
is a member of a protected class; (2) he applied for the job; (3) he
was qualified for the job; (4) the employer refused to hire him, or
made some other adverse employment decision; (5) the employer
continued to seek applicants.8 9 Once the plaintiff makes out a
prima facie case, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to
come forward with legitimate reasons for the rejection. 0 After the
employer comes forward with such reasons, the burden shifts back
to the plaintiff to show that the employer's stated reasons were a
pretext for discrimination.9 1
Once the plaintiff has established discrimination in disparate
treatment cases, the defendant has a defense available only in sex,
national origin, and religion cases. Section 703(e) of the Civil
Rights Act provides an exemption where sex, national origin, or
religion is a "bona fide occupational qualification" necessary for
the normal completion of the job.92 The bona-fide-occupational-
qualification exception thus reflects a judgment that certain func-
tional differences, both physically and culturally defined, exist be-
tween the sexes, and that employers legitimately can accomodate
86. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340-41 (1977).
87. Id. at 340-41. But see Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1975). "The
district court erred in requiring proof of actual discrimination in addition to the statistical
data implying discrimination. Statistics can in appropriate cases establish a prima facie case
of discrimination, without the necessity of showing specific instances of overt discrimina-
tion." Id. at 549. The Fourth Circuit understands appropriate cases as those cases in which
statistics clearly underline discriminatory treatment of a class. Barnett was just such a case.
The community was 25% black, but the defendant employed no black supervisory person-
nel. Of the 17% of defendant's nonsupervisory personnel who were black, all were assigned
to one of 17 job categories. Id.
88. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
89. See id. at 801-02.
90. Id. at 802.
91. Id. at 804. The facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and therefore the prima
facie proof required of the plaintiff will vary depending upon the facts of the case. Id. at 802
n.13.
92. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976).
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such differences in their hiring patterns.93 Yet the courts have con-
strued the bona fide occupational qualification so narrowly as to
have only a limited effect on the broad prohibitions of Title VII.9 4
Disparate Impact
Disparate impact cases involve facially neutral employment
practices that adversely affect a class protected under Title VII 9 5
Examples of such practices include high school degree require-
ments or tests that disqualify more blacks than whites," and mini-
mum height requirements that disqualify more women than men.9
93. Rep. Goodell sponsored the amendment of § 703(e) to include sex, citing the example
of an elderly woman in a nursing home who desires a female nurse. 110 CONG. REc. 2718
(1964).
During the Senate's consideration of Title VII, Senators Clark and Case offered an inter-
pretive memorandum discussing its provisions. According to the memorandum, the bona-
fide-occupational-qualification exception creates
a limited right to discriminate on the basis of religion, sex or national origin
where the reason for the discrimination is a bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion. Examples of such legitimate discrimination would be the preference of a
French restaurant for a French cook, the preference of a professional baseball
team for male players, and the preference of a business which seeks the pa-
tronage of members of particular religious groups for a salesman of that
religion.
Id. at 7213. Another example of a bona fide occupational qualification would be a masseur.
Id. at 2720 (remarks of Rep. Multer). For further discussion of the bona fide occupational
qualification, see note 302 & accompanying text infra.
94. See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971) (practice
of hiring only females as flight attendants not protected by bona-fide-occupational-qualifica-
tion exception); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235-36 (5th Cir. 1969)
(employer failed to prove position as telephone switchman was within the bfoq exception,
despite evidence as to strenuousness of work). See also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,
334 (1977) ("We are persuaded . . . that the bfoq exception was in fact meant to be an
extremely narrow exception to the general prohibition of discrimination on the basis of
sex.").
95. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). For a
discussion of whether a compensation discrimination claim not cognizable under the Equal
Pay Act is available under Title VII in the absence of intent to discriminate on a "disparate
impact" theory, see id.
96. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). In Griggs the Supreme Court held
that a plaintiff need not prove discriminatory motive if employment practices operate to
exclude disproportionately a protected class from employment, unless the employer can jus-
tify such practices on the basis of business necessity. Id. at 431-32.
97. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328-29 (1977).
[T]o establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff need only show
that the facially neutral standards in question select applicants for hire in a
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The plaintiff makes out a prima facie case by showing, generally
through statistics, that the practice has a disproportionately ad-
verse effect on the protected class.9 8 The burden then shifts to the
defendant to show that business necessity requires the practice. 9
Ferreting out discrimination in all areas of employment decision-
making is the concern of Title VII, and hence the purpose of Title
VII is to dissuade employers from engaging in intentional discrimi-
nation and to address those employment practices that, although
fair on their face, have a discriminatory impact. Title VII claims
focus on the employer's intent in formulating employment prac-
tices, in contrast to the Equal Pay Act's strict liability standards.
The courts must decide whether Congress intended the generally
extensive character of Title VII to apply to sex-based wage dis-
crimination. The two prominent cases of Gunther v. County of
Washington00 and IUE v. Westinghouse10 ' dealt specifically with
these issues.
Gunther v. County of Washington
In Gunther, plaintiffs were four jail matrons at the Washington
County jail in Oregon.10 2 The matrons guarded female inmates;
significantly discriminatory pattern. Once it is shown that the employment
standards are discriminatory in effect, the employer must meet "the burden of
showing that any requirement [has]... a manifest relationship to the employ-
ment in question."
Id. at 329 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)) (citations omitted).
98. Proof of disparate impact usually depends upon statistics comparing the number of
blacks or women hired with their availability in the relevant market area. In accord with the
laws of probability, the number of blacks or women hired or promoted must be within a
"reasonable range" of the number of blacks or women available for employment. See Inter-
national Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 n.20 (1977). The definition of
"reasonable range" lies within the courts' discretion.
In hiring cases, for entry level or low skilled jobs, the courts look to the percentage of
blacks or women in the community work force. Thus, a plaintiff only need prove a discrimi-
natory impact on women in the general population, as in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 443 U.S.
321, 329-31 (1977). In a promotion case, dealing with jobs that legitimately require skills or
experience, the courts look to the proportion of blacks or women present in the employer's
work force. See Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 144, 150 (N.D. Ala.
1977).
99. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432-33 (1971).
100. 602 .F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3332 (1980) (No. 80-429).
101. 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 588 (3d Cir. 1980).
102. 602 F.2d at 885.
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male guards guarded male inmates and received higher pay. The
matrons claimed that the pay differential was sex-based and there-
fore proscribed by section 703(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.103
The first step in the traditional procedure for adjudicating a sex-
based wage discrimination claim is an assessment of the equality of
the jobs. The district court in Gunther found that the jobs under
comparison were not substantially equal.1 Although both jobs re-
quired the same skill, the men's and women's labors demonstrated
different levels of effort and responsibility. 10 5
Normally in equal pay actions a finding that the jobs are un-
equal terminates litigation. The matrons claimed, however, that
even if the jobs compared were unequal, the court ought to allow
them to prove that the discrepancy in wages resulted from sex
discrimination. 10 6
After analyzing the relevant legislative histories and administra-
tive regulations, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit concluded that the broad interpretation of the Bennett
Amendment best expressed the congressional aim of eliminating
sex-based wage discrimination.1 0 7 In the court's view, reading the
Bennett Amendment to limit section 703(a)'s ban on compensation
discrimination to only those practices prohibited by the Equal Pay
Act would frustrate the remedial purpose of Title VIP s0 and "insu-
late other equally harmful discriminatory practices from re-
view.' 109 An example of a discriminatory practice that should not
escape review is the instance of women employed in jobs compara-
ble to, though not substantially equal to, that performed by men.
If the jobs are not substantially equal, an employer is free under
the Equal Pay Act to decrease the wages of women solely because
of their sex. According to the Ninth Circuit, "[sluch a practice is
prohibited by the plain language of § 703 and will continue to be
103. Id. at 886, 888.
104. Id. at 886.
105. Male jailers guarded more prisoners than the matrons, and the matrons spent sub-
stantial time performing clerical duties. Id.
106. Id. at 886, 888.
107. See id. at 890.
108. See id.
109. Id. (footnote omitted).
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our interpretation of the Bennett Amendment." 110
The Ninth Circuit emphasized that Congress intended Title VII
to sweep broadly in the area of employment discrimination., 1
Therefore, even if the Bennett Amendment incorporates the equal
job limitation of the Equal Pay Act into Title VII, such a construc-
tion would not affect claims in which the plaintiffs allege unlawful
discrimination but not equal work.112 The affirmative defenses con-
tained in the Bennett Amendment would apply only to actions
seeking equal pay for equal work in which plaintiff does not allege
discriminatory purpose. 1 3 Thus, the Ninth Circuit recognized an
additional claim not traditionally included within the Equal Pay
Act standard by approving the matrons' contention that Title VII
encompasses claims that deviate from the equal pay for equal work
standard. 14
[W]e hold that, although decisions interpreting the Equal Pay
Act are authoritative where plaintiffs suing under Title VII raise
a claim of equal pay, plaintiffs are not precluded from suing
under Title VII to protest other discriminatory compensation
practices unless the practices are authorized by one of the four
affirmative defenses contained in the Equal Pay Act and incor-
porated into Title VII by § 703(h).]1 5
The Equal Pay Act imposes strict liability; proof that men and
women perform substantially equal work, requiring equal skill, ef-
fort, and responsibility and performed under similar working con-
ditions, for unequal pay establishes a violation regardless of the
intent of the employer.116 Therefore allegations of discriminatory
purpose under Title VII need not rely on Equal Pay Act standards.
The Ninth Circuit in Gunther emphasized that the Equal Pay Act
110. Id. at 890 n.9.
111. See id. at 890. The decisions of the Supreme Court have emphasized the sweeping
nature of Title VII's prohibitions of discrimination and the duty of the courts to construe
Title VII so as to give the greatest possible effect to the statute. See United Steelworkers of
America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
112. 602 F.2d at 890.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 891.
115. Id.
116. IUE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 450, 453 (D.N.J. 1979),
rev'd, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 588 (3d Cir. 1980).
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applies only when a plaintiff does not receive equal pay for equal
work.117
IUE v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.""'
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit in Gunther, the district court in
IUE v. Westinghouse refused to expand the scope of Title VII be-
yond the Equal Pay Act.119 Plaintiffs brought suit in the district
court, alleging inter alia'20 that the Westinghouse Electric Corpo-
ration set the pay rates of women lower than the pay rates of men
solely because of sex 21 by deliberately paying lower wages for work
done predominantly by women.12 2 As evidence of such discrimina-
tion, the plaintiffs pointed to discriminatory effects of a recently
discarded wage system at Westinghouse. 23 Until 1965, the West-
inghouse wage system considered the sex of the worker in deter-
mining the wage rate assigned to a job.2 Also until 1965, the wage
rates paid to female workers were lower than the wage rates paid
117. The court stated:
[W]e hold that Equal Pay Act standards apply in Title VII suits when plain-
tiffs raise a claim of equal pay. When plaintiffs raise a claim of discriminatory
compensation in the absence of an allegation that they perform substantially
equal work, no conflict with the Equal Pay Act arises because the Equal Pay
Act is inapplicable.
602 F.2d at 891.
118. 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 450 (D.N.J. 1979), rev'd, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 588 (3d
Cir. 1980).
119. Id. at 452. In August 1980, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cicuit
reversed the district court in IUE. The rationale for that decision will be discussed at length
at text accompanying notes 136-145 infra.
120. Plaintiffs alleged the following violations:
(a) paying women unequal pay in that male employees performing the same
or substantially the same work receive higher pay.
(b) paying women lower rates of pay than would be paid them if their skill,
effort, and responsibility were evaluated on the same basis as is used in evalu-
ating work performed by males; and
(c) failing to afford women the rights of promotion and transfer to better
paying jobs on the same basis as males; and
(d) otherwise affording women unequal compensation, terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment because of their sex.
23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 588 n.1 (3d Cir. 1980).
121. 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 451.
122. Id.
123. 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 590-91.
124. Id.
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to male workers for jobs that Westinghose considered to be of
equal value.125
In 1965, the company established a unitary classification system
in which the grades had no explicit sexual designation. 126 The
plaintiffs contended that the present wage scale embodied the de-
liberately discriminatory policy of the prior plan.12 7 They con-
tended that Westinghouse expanded the number of labor grades in
the new scale, placing female jobs below those male jobs, even
though the jobs had been at corresponding labor grades before the
merger.1 28 They also pointed to the vast majority of women that
still were employed in "female jobs. 1 29 Although the plaintiffs ac-
knowledged that "'there ha[d] been some changes in job content
over the years, and some rate adjustments' in their view 'the
changes [had] not eradicated the wage inequities established by
the [earlier] system.'."130
The district court determined that the plaintiffs did not perform
work substantially equal to that performed by male employees.131
The question then became whether sex-based wage discrimination
claims under Title VII are limited to conduct that also would be
actionable under the Equal Pay Act. In the district court's view,
the mandated affirmative answer was "purely a matter of statutory
construction."'132 Westinghouse, therefore, had not violated Title
VII. In arriving at its conclusion, the district court examined the
legislative history of Title VH and the administrative and judicial
intepretations of the Equal Pay Act.1 3 Guiding the court was the
policy consideration that employees should not be subject to two
confliciting standards.3  Therefore, the court held that Title VII
and the Equal Pay Act establish identical standards of sex-based
wage discrimination, specifically, the Equal Pay Act's equal work
standard. Judge Barlow summarized his holding by stating that
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 590-91.
130. Id. at 591 (citations omitted).
131. 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 452.
132. Id. at 462.
133. Id. at 453-57.
134. Id. at 453.
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"allegations and proof of unequal pay for unequal, but comparable
work, does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted
"'135
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit re-
jected the district court's interpretation and criticized the lower
court's justifications for the supremacy of the Equal Pay Act stan-
dard in sex-based wage discrimination suits. 36 The Third Circuit
emphasized repeatedly that deviation from a broad interpretation
of the Bennett Amendment would result in "a substantial limita-
tion on the scope of Title VII's power to address the problems of
sex-based discrimination in employment,"' 7 and hence would con-
flict with Congress' goals.
Thus, agreeing with the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Gunther, the
Third Circuit found that Congress did not intend to protect inten-
tionally discriminatory wage practices when it adopted the Bennett
Amendment.138 The Third Circuit rejected any interpretation of
the Bennett Amendment that would permit employers to discrimi-
nate against women but would prohibit the same acts if based on
race, religion, or national origin.'39 The court presented a hypo-
thetical wherein an employer was paying welders higher wages
than plumbers because the welders were Protestant and the
plumbers were Catholic."40 A successful plaintiff would have to
prove the employer was intentionally discriminating on the basis of
religion, an infringement of Title VII. Yet a construction of Title
VII as coextensive with the Equal Pay Act would not prohibit the
payment of wage differentials if the distinction hinged on sex
rather than religion. Because female plumbers would not be en-
gaged in equal work with male welders, the employer intentionally
could pay women less, solely because they are women."' The court
stated:
[I]t is clear that Westinghouse could not create job classifica-
135. Id. at 457.
136. IUE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 588, 592-93 (3d Cir.
1980).
137. Id. at 592.
138. Id. at 592-93, 598.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 592.
141. Id.
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tions whereby different wages were paid to one group solely be-
cause of considerations of religion, race or national origin. The
statutory issue here is whether Congress intended to permit
Westinghouse to willfully discriminate against women in a way
in which it could not discriminate against blacks or whites, Jews
or Gentiles, Protestants or Catholics, Italians or Irishmen, or
any other group protected by the Act.142
By phrasing its holding in terms of job classifications,143 the
court sought to focus the impact of Title VII on those cases in
which an employer intentionally discriminated on the basis of sex.
The court recognized that employers could manipulate job classifi-
cations to create pay disparities between the sexes; 4 4 conse-
quently, the negative impact of such job classifications on discrete
groups of individuals may evidence an employer's intent to dis-
criminate. Therefore the court allowed the plaintiffs to present evi-
dence of the employer's discriminatory purpose, regardless of the
nature of the jobs under scrutiny.145
One major defect in the Third Circuit's opinion was a failure to
answer the important policy objections raised by the dissenting
justice, Van Dusen.'" He argued that elimination of the equal pay
standard for litigation of sex-based wage discrimination claims
forces the court to evaluate subjectively the relative worth of dif-
ferent jobs.247 When a plaintiff alleges sex-based wage discrimina-
tion, he can compare his job to any other job and allege salary dif-
ferentials as evidence of discriminatory practice."48 According to
Justice Van Dusen, the intrusion by the judiciary into the realm of
business decisionmaking would disrupt totally the free-market sys-
tem, in direct contradiction to congressional intentions.1 49
The Third Circuit tried to avoid the policy implications of its
decision by restricting its holding to cases involving intentional
discrimination on the part of employers in creating job classifica-
142. Id. at 590 (footnote omitted).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 590-91.
145. Id. at 590.
146. Id. at 598-600, 604 (Van Dusen, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 599-600, 604 (Van Dusen, J., dissenting).
148. Id. (Van Dusen, J., dissenting).
149. Id. (Van Dusen, J., dissenting).
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tion systems.150 In IUE the employer, while making his own job
evaluations, engaged in blatantly discriminatory practices.151 The
court of appeals dealt only with allegations of an unfair classifica-
tion system, not with the worth of differing jobs.5 2 In its analysis
the court simply ignored potential claims under Title VII alleging
unequal pay for comparable work. Although the Third Circuit im-
proved the Ninth Circuit's articulation of the issues, the evasion of
such policy problems weakened the force of the decision in IUE.
ANALYSIS OF CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
An evaluation of the language, statutory construction and cover-
age of the Equal Pay Act, Title VII, and the Bennett Amendment
supports the conclusion of the Ninth and Third Circuits that only
the four exceptions of the Equal Pay Act are incorporated into Ti-
tle VII.
Statutory Construction
Congress passed the Equal Pay Act in 1963 and the Civil Rights
Act in 1964. Traditionally, courts have followed a general rule of
statutory construction that an earlier, narrower statute will restrict
the scope of a subsequent statute enacted without the limiting pro-
visions of the first law. 3 If this principle of statutory construction
applied, Title VII and the Equal Pay Act would be coextensive.
In conflict with this guideline is the rule cited by the Third Cir-
cuit in IUE: "where a statute with respect to one subject contains
a specific provision, the omission of such provision from a similar
statute is significant to show a different intention existed."15' Ad-
hering to this rule of statutory construction, the Third Circuit
found that the Equal Pay Act standards did not control litigation
under Title VII.155
150. Id. at 590. See id. at 604 (Van Dusen, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 590-91.
152. Id.
153. C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51.02 (4th ed. 1973). See Com-
ment, The Bennett Amendment-Title VII and Gender Based Discrimination, 68 GEO. L.J.
1169, 1176 & n.54 (1980).
154. 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 593 (citations omitted) (quoting Richardson v. Jones, 551
F.2d 918, 928 (3d Cir. 1977)).
155. Id. at 593-94.
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One rule of statutory construction cannot resolve the issue, how-
ever, for the dissent in IUE postulated its own rule of statutory
construction to support its narrow interpretation of the Bennett
Amendment. The dissenting justice argued that the in pari
materia156 canon of statutory construction should govern the rela-
tionship of the laws. 157 Under such a canon, a "'statute dealing
with a narrow, precise and specific subject is not submerged by a
later enacted statute covering a more generalized spectrum. Where
there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be
controlled or nullified by a general one, regardless of the priority of
enactment.' "" Thus, the in pari materia rule of statutory con-
struction supports the narrow interpretation of the Bennett
Amendment.
Language of the Bennett Amendment
To ascertain how Congress intended to eliminate sex-based wage
156. Ballentine's Law Dictionary defines "in pan materia" as follows:
Statutes which relate to the same thing or to the same subject or object are in
pari materia, although they were enacted at different times and it is a funda-
mental rule of statutory construction that such statutes should be construed
together for the purpose of learning and giving effect to the legislative
intention.
BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY at 632 (3d ed. 1969).
157. The dissent argued that the in pari materia doctrine demanded similar construction
of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII. 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 600. In pari materia, how-
ever, merely means that a court must construe statutes relating to the same subject harmo-
niously. See Schultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 266 (1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
905 (1970) (Title VII and the Equal Pay Act should "be harmonized to work together in
service of the underlying Congressional objective").
158. 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 600 (Van Dusen, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quot-
ing Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976)). The majority in IUE
declined to apply the in pari materia canon on the grounds of the Supreme Court's admoni-
tion that "remedies for employment discrimination 'supplement' each other and should not
be construed so as to ignore the differences among them." Id. at 593 (quoting Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48-49 & n.9 (1974)).
This brief examination of some rules of statutory construction reveals the conflict pervad-
ing such judicial decisionmaking. The vague language of congressional bills gives the court a
carte blanche to interpret the scope of the laws. In reconciling the provisions of the Equal
Pay Act and Title VII, each proponent cited rules of statutory construction to support his
interpretation. Both sets of rules are valid. The courts are the final arbiters as to which set
ought to receive greater weight. The Ninth and Third Circuits determined that the rules
having greater validity were those supporting the broad interpretation of the Bennett
Amendment.
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discrimination one first must evaluate the language of the relevant
statutes.15 Section 703(a)(1) and (2) of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 indicates that Congress intended a general prohibition
against discrimination in compensation with respect to protected
classes, without limitation to any particular form of discrimina-
tion.16 0 In United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,161 the Su-
preme Court insisted that courts interpret Title VII to accord with
Congress' overall intent to prohibit invidious discrimination
against minorities and women. 62
The Bennett Amendment provides:
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this sub-
chapter for an employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in
determining the amount of the wages or compensation paid or to
be paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation is
authorized by provisions of section 206(d) of Title 29.13
Section 206(d) of the Equal Pay Act provides that after the plain-
tiff has proven a prima facie case of discrimination, unequal pay
for equal work, the employer has four exceptions available to jus-
tify the payment of wage differentials based on sex.16 4 Thus the
Bennett Amendment provides that a sex-based wage differential
shall not violate Title VII if the Equal Pay Act authorizes the dif-
ferential. The key word to construe is "authorized." "Authorized"
means more than "not prohibited"; it connotes official sanction or
approval. Arguably, a court could find that the Equal Pay Act au-
thorizes compensation practices that are discriminatory and rule
that the proper interpretation of the Bennett Amendment requires
that what the Equal Pay Act does not prohibit explicitly is
authorized.
Nothing in the language of the Bennett Amendment suggests
that Congress intended the term "authorized" to have a meaning
so at variance with its ordinary use by the public, and so at vari-
ance with its use by Congress in enacting other statutes. The Con-
159. Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 60 (1980).
160. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976). For relevant text of the statute, see note 80 supra.
161. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
162. Id. at 203-04.
163. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
164. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976). For relevant text of the Act, see note 35 supra.
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gress simply could have used the phrase "not prohibited" in place
of authorized if it intended the two statutes to be coextensive; thus
the Bennett Amendment would prevent a Title VII challenge to
any sex-based wage differential "not prohibited" by the provisions
of the Equal Pay Act.
A more natural reading 6 5 of the Bennett Amendment exempts
from the prohibitions of Title VII those wage differentials that
Congress sanctioned in enacting the Equal Pay Act. The Ninth
Circuit in Gunther held that when Congress passed the Equal Pay
Act, it authorized those practices permitted by the four affirmative
defenses.16 6 Likewise, the Third Circuit held that "the plain lan-
guage of the statute suggests that only the four exceptions of the
Equal Pay Act were incorporated as limitations on Title VII. '1' 67
Location of the Bennett Amendment
The Bennett Amendment appears in that part of section 703
dealing with defenses."6 8 The Equal Pay Act affirmative defenses
165. Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575 (1975). "[Wlords used in a statute are to be given their
ordinary meaning in the absence of persuasive reasons to the contrary .... " Id. at 580.
Thus, the Equal Pay Act does not authorize sex-based wage discrimination merely because
Congress did not forbid all possible discriminatory practices in that Act. Discrimination that
does not fit into the equal pay for equal work formula merely is not covered by the Equal
Pay Act.
166. 602 F.2d 882, 890 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3332 (1980) (No. 80-
429).
167. IUE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 588, 594 (3d Cir. 1980).
168. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976). The full text of § 703(h), showing the context in which
this language appears in the statute, is as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of
compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pur-
suant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a system which measures
earnings by quantity or quality or production or to employees who work in
different locations, provided that such differences are not the result of an in-
tention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,
nor shall it be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give and to
act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that
such test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed, in-
tended or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national
origin.
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter for
any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount
of the wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer
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incorporated into Title VII are, like other provisions of section
703(h), defenses to employment practices that otherwise would
constitute a Title VII violation. They are not part of the definition
of a violation. As defenses, the employer bears the burden of prov-
ing them if the plaintiff has established a prima facie showing of a
violation.69 If Senator Bennett intended to alter the definition of
compensation discrimination under Title VII, the simpler and
clearer choice lay in incorporating the Equal Pay Act standard into
section 703(a), in which Title VII lists prohibited practices. There-
fore, one may conclude that the purpose of the Bennett Amend-
ment was to incorporate the defenses of the Equal Pay Act into
Title VII, not to limit the type of discrimination suits litigable
under the statute. Until Congress adopted the Bennett Amend-
ment, Title VII had no provision comparable to the Equal Pay Act
defense for wage differentials based on "any other factor other
than sex. '170 Yet the addition of the "factor other than sex" was a
if such differentiation is authorized by the provisions of section 206(d) of Title
29.
Id.
169. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
170. One criticism of the broad interpretation of the Bennett Amendment is that other
language of § 703(h) already provides exceptions analagous to the Equal Pay Act exceptions.
Therefore an interpretation that limits the concern of the Bennett Amendment solely to the
four affirmative defenses renders the amendment superfluous. The criticism fails, however,
because the Bennett Amendment does not merely reiterate exceptions contained in § 703(h)
of Title VII. Although § 703(h) already contained exceptions similar to three of the four
exceptions of the Equal Pay Act before Congress adopted the Bennett Amendment, whether
a court in 1964 would have construed the similar exceptions of the Equal Pay Act and Title
VII in exactly the same manner was by no means clear.
Originally, the Title VII bill did not include any of the language of § 703(h). When the
Mansfield-Dirksen substitute bill was introduced, it added what is now the first sentence of
§ 703(h). 110 CONG. REc. 11,926, 11,931 (1964). Thereafter, the Senate adopted the Bennett
Amendment. Without the Bennett Amendment no assurance existed that these newly added
provisions of Title VII would be construed in the same fashion as the comparable defenses
in the Equal Pay Act. Indeed, the language of the three Title VII defenses is not identical to
the comparable provisions of the Equal Pay Act. The qualification in the first sentence of §
703(h) that seniority and merit systems must be "bona fide" in order to provide a defense to
a claim of unequal treatment does not appear in the Equal Pay Act. In 1963 Congress was
aware of the importance of the interpretation of the Equal Pay Act defenses. In the course
of the Equal Pay Act debate, Congressman Fountain stated: "Certain exceptions are set
forth in the bill, one being a 'seniority system.' I think the record ought to show just what is
meant by the term 'seniority system'-especially the word 'system'. . . ." 109 CONG. REc.
9203 (1963). A discussion followed resolving that to qualify for the statutory defense a "sys-
tem" need not be of a formal nature or described in writing. Id. at 9208. The Labor Depart-
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prime objective of employer representatives in the course of devel-
opment of the Equal Pay Act. Congress regarded the addition of
the "factor other than sex" provision to the Equal Pay Act as an
important step, and discussed at length the types of practices that
would receive protection as a result. 1 2
Moreover, the incorporation of the "factor other than sex" de-
fense clarifies the burden of proof in an equal pay case brought
under Title VII. 7 s Under the Equal Pay Act, the employer bears
the burden of showing that its practice falls within one of the four
defenses. The incorporation of the fourth affirmative defense clari-
fies the point that once a Title VII plaintiff has shown she did not
receive equal pay for equal work, the burden shifts to the employer
to show that its practice falls within one of the four defenses, spe-
cifically that the employer based a wage differential on a factor
other than sex. For example, if an employer could justify a sex
classification as a bona fide occupational qualification under Title
VII, he might still be liable for a discriminatory wage differential if
unable to validate that the differential was the result of a "factor
other than sex.' ' 7 4 The Bennett Amendment thus achieved a sig-
nificant result in ensuring consistency in the interpretation of the
defenses employed under the Equal Pay Act and Title VII and in
ensuring that the detailed legislative history regarding the meaning
of the "factor other than sex" provision of the Equal Pay Act, and
ment subsequently promulgated a regulation to this effect. 29 C.F.R. § 800.144 (1979).
Conflicts between the two statutes could arise when both laws are applicable, that is, in a
case involving equal work as defined under the Equal Pay Act, but in which the defenses
available under the Equal Pay Act might not be available under Title VII. Therefore, the
design of the Bennett Amendment is to ensure that the statutes do not present employers
and employees with two conflicting standards.
171. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 3861 and Related Bills Before the Special Subcomm. on
Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 139 (1963) (state-
ment of John G. Wayman); id. at 102 (statement of W. Boyd Owen); id. at 159 (statement of
William Miller); id. at 206 (proposed amendments offered by Counsel of State Chambers of
Commerce).
172. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 309, supra note 6; 109 CONG. REC. 9203 (remarks of Rep.
Griffin); id. at 9196 (remarks of Rep. Thompson); id. at 9206 (remarks of Rep. Goodell). As
the debates reflect, the defense based on a "factor other than sex" was designed to protect a
variety of practices such as shift differentials and differentials for temporary work.
173. Gunther v. County of Wash., 623 F.2d 1317, 1319 (9th Cir. 1980) (petition for rehear-
ing denied), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3332 (1980) (No. 80-429).
174. Id. at 1319 n.1.
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the Labor Department's interpretations of that provision,1 75 would
apply under Title VII as well.
Independent Coverage of Equal Pay Act and Title VII
Final support for the broad interpretation of the Bennett
Amendment is the vast difference in coverage characterizing the
Equal Pay Act and Title VII. If Congress intended the two statutes
to be coextensive, then logically the Bennett Amendment should
incorporate into Title VII not only the equal work formula of the
Equal Pay Act, but also the Act's exemptions, employers, periods
of limitations, and all other differences in coverage. Instead, the
differing scopes of coverage of Title VII and the Equal Pay Act
over regulation of employees and employers and the differing pro-
visions for remedies imply that Congress intended the courts to
construe the two statutes separately.
The potential plaintiff's choice of remedy, either Title VII or
Equal Pay Act, or both, will depend upon a number of factors.
Thus questions of coverage,176 procedures, 177 statutes of lmita-
175. Seven weeks prior to the enactment of the Bennett Amendment, the Administrator
of the Wage and Hour Division had specified a series of factors that could establish this
defense: red-circle rates, temporary assignments to lower-rated or higher-rated jobs, bona
fide training programs, differentials for heads of households, and differentials for temporary
or part-time employees. See 29 Fed. Reg. 5555-56 (1964) (current version at 29 C.F.R. §§
800.146, .148-.150 (1979)).
176. Title VII applies to employers with 15 or more employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)
(1976). The Equal Pay Act coverage provisions, however, derive from the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976). Usually at least two employees, one male and one
female, will be necessary to establish a violation of the Equal Pay Act. The male and female
employees need not work for the employer at the same time, however. Thus a female truck
driver who receives less compensation than a male successor or predecessor could bring a
claim against the employer under the Equal Pay Act. See Pearce v. Witchita County, 590
F.2d 128, 133-34 (5th Cir. 1979); Peltier v. City of Fargo, 533 F.2d 374, 377 (8th Cir. 1976).
Under Title VII, one may establish a violation based upon a comparison of wages of males
with the wages of females who do not work in the same establishment. Wetzel v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 232, 239-40 (W.D. Pa. 1978). Under the Equal Pay
Act, the male and female employees must work in the same establishment in order to prove
a violation. Gerlach v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 448 F. Supp. 1168, 1171 (E.D. Mich. 1978);
Schultz v. Corning Glass Works, 319 F. Supp. 1161, 1163 (W.D.N.Y. 1970).
177. The absence of statutory prerequisites to suit under the Equal Pay Act is a distinct
advantage of the Act over the detailed prerequisites to a suit under Title VII. Sullivan, The
Equal Pay Act of 1963: Making and Breaking a Prima Facie Case, 31 ARi. L. REv. 545, 546
n.10 (1978). See generally Sullivan, The Enforcement of Title VII: Meshing Public and
Private Efforts, 71 Nw. L. REv. 480 (1976). For example, claimants first must file a Title VII
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tions, 17 remedies, and the availability of a jury trial'80 may in-
fluence a plaintiff to opt for one or the other alternatives. For these
reasons, to construe Title VII as relaxing the equal work limittion
of the Equal Pay Act in no way would convert the enactment of
the 1964 statute into a de facto repeal of the Equal Pay Act. The
Equal Pay Act and Title VII both have value within their own par-
ticular province of sex discrimination litigation. Therefore, a close
reading and comparison of the texts of the two statutes and the
Bennett Amendment relating them supports the Ninth and Third
Circuit's expansive approach to wage discrimination litigation.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES
The uncertain effect of the Bennett Amendment has forced the
courts to decide whether Congress intended to adopt a unitary or
multi-faceted approach to the problem of sex-based wage discrimi-
complaint with a state agency, and 60 days later may file with the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(b) to (c) (1976). The EEOC must reach a finding of reasonable cause before initiat-
ing suit. Id. § 2000e-5(1). The Equal Pay Act contains no corresponding provisions. Also a
plaintiff may bring an Equal Pay Act suit in either state or federal court. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)
(1976). A plaintiff must bring Title VII actions in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(f)(3) (1976).
178. A two year statute of limitations generally governs Equal Pay Act actions, although a
three year limit applies if "willful violations" are involved. 29 U.S.C. § 255 (1976). See gen-
erally Richards, Monetary Awards in Equal Pay Litigation, 29 ARK. L. REV. 328, 330-41
(1975). Title VII's limitations are considerably more complex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976).
See Sullivan & Zimmer, The South Carolina Human Affairs Law: Two Steps Forward One
Step Back?, 26 S.C. L. REv. 1, 21-37 (1974).
179. Differences exist between the Equal Pay Act and Title VII with respect to the availa-
bility of both monetary and injunctive relief. Perhaps the most significant difference is that
the Equal Pay Act permits an award of "liquidated damages" in an amount equal to the
unpaid wages due, in addition to those unpaid wages. Hence, plaintiff receives double dam-
ages. See Richards, Compensatory and Punitive Damages in Employment Discrimination
Cases, 27 ARK. L. Rnv. 603 (1973).
Under Title VII, all monetary relief is subject to the discretion of the court, although
Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), states that if discrimination causes
loss, an award of back pay is usually appropriate. Id. at 421. Conversely, under the Equal
Pay Act, the court does not have discretion in the award of damages. If the court finds
discrimination, it must award the plaintiff back pay equal to the compensation payable if
the employer had employed or promoted the plaintiff without discrimination. 29 U.S.C. §
216(a)-(d) (1976).
180. Under Title VII a jury trial is never possible. See Richards, supra note 179, at 622-
30. The issue is not clear under the Equal Pay Act, perhaps turning on the kind of suit and
relief sought. See Note, Fair Labor Standards Act and Trial by Jury, 65 COLUM. L. REv.
514 (1965).
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nation. In deciding the question, the courts have consulted the leg-
islative histories of the Equal Pay Act, Title VII, and the Bennett
Amendment. A review of the legislative histories in chronological
order reveals ambiguous congressional intentions.
Legislative History of The Equal Pay Act
In devising the Equal Pay Act, Congress did not attempt to draft
a broad antidiscrimination statute. Rather, it devised a "simple
and straightforward amendment of the Fair Labor Standards
Act,"181 adding one new labor standard to the economic protections
previously provided in that act.182 The Equal Pay Act set forth
both an objective standard for determining clear instances in
which employers had depressed the wages of women workers and a
requirement "that these depressed wages be raised, in part as mat-
ter of simple justice to the employees themselves, but also as a
matter of market economics ... 18
181. 109 CONG. REC. 7294 (1963) (remarks of Sen. McNamara).
182. Senator McNamara, the chairman of the Senate Labor Subcommittee, so described
the statute when he introduced it on the Senate floor.
As we all know, the FLSA provides that workers must be paid a decent mini-
mum wage; that if employees must put in long hours, they must be paid at an
overtime rate; and that children may only be employed under rigid conditions
which protect their health and safety.
The bill I now introduce would add one additional fair labor standard to the
act; namely that employees doing equal work should be paid equal wages re-
gardless of sex.
109 CONG. REC. 7294 (1963). See also S. REP. No. 176, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1963); H.R.
REP. No. 309, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1963), reprinted in [1963] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 687, 688.
183. Cowing Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 207 (1974). The Supreme Court held
that the congressional purpose was
to remedy what was perceived to be a serious and endemic problem of employ-
ment discrimination in private industry-the fact that the wage structure of
"many segments of American industry has been based on an ancient but out-
moded belief that a man because of his role in society, should be paid more
than a woman though his duties are the same." The solution adopted was quite
simple in principle: to require that "equal work will be rewarded by equal
wages."
Id. at 195 (quoting S. Ran. No. 176, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1963)).
The Third Circuit in Schultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 905 (1970), construed the Act as a "broad charter of women's rights in the
economic field. It sought to overcome the age-old belief in women's inferiority and to elimi-
nate the depressing effects on living standards in reduced wages for female workers .....
Id. at 265.
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The Equal Pay Act is a narrow statute that does not have the
broad sweep of Title VII. The supporters of the Act never saw it as
the answer to sex discrimination in employment. Rather, the sup-
porters recognized the bill, enacted at a time when no federal law
prohibited sex discrimination in employment, as a small, first step
in gaining equality of employment opportunities for women.""'
As originally introduced, the bill provided that employers were
to pay "equal wages for comparable work.'1 85 After extensive de-
184. The remarks of Congresswoman Bolton reflect the congressional consensus: "I would
like to consider this bill and have you consider it as one of the first steps toward an adjust-
ment of balance in pay for women." 109 CONG. REc. 9193 (1963).
Congresswoman Kelly likewise viewed the statute as "a beginning to seek and establish
corrective legislation for equal pay. . . ." Id. at 9201 (1963). See also id. at 9205 (remarks
of Rep. Sullivan); id. at 9193 (remarks of Rep. St. George); id. at 9195 (remarks of Rep.
Felinghuysen); id. at 9196 (remarks of Rep. Thompson); id. at 9204 (remarks of Rep. Toll).
Congress clearly expected in 1963 to enact additional, more far-reaching legislation in this
area.
Although the Equal Pay Act was the first federal law that addressed the problem of sex
discrimination, equal pay for equal work already was a subject of interest to American legis-
lators. When Congress enacted the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 22 states already had enacted
equal pay statutes. Id. at 8916 (remarks of Sen. Randolph).
Equal pay principles were not novel to the federal government in 1963, as declarations
and orders supporting equal pay principles were promulgated by the United States Railroad
Administration in 1918, the Women in Industry Service in 1919, and the National Railroad
Administration in 1933. See Gitt & Gelb, supra note 1, at 737. After World War II, Con-
gressmen periodically attempted to enact federal equal pay legislation. Id. Some of the bills
include: S. 1178, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945); S. 1556, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); S. 706,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949); H.R. 3550, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); S. 176, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1954); H.R. 59, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); H.R. 394, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); S.
3926, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960); and S. 2494, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
185. H.R. 8898, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1962); H.R. 10,226, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1962);
108 CONG. REc. 14,767 (1962).
The payment of equal wages for comparable work was not a novel policy in 1962. In Nov-
ember 1917, the War Department issued General Order 13, which provided that wages paid
to men should not be lowered for women rendering equal service. See Bladek, The Equal
Pay Act of 1963, 18 N.Y.U. CONF. LAB. 381, 388 (1965); Fisher, Equal Pay for Equal Work
Legislation, 2 LAB. L.J. 57 (1951). The War Labor Board, created by Executive Order No.
9017, was responsible for ensuring industrial stability and mediating disputes between man-
agement and labor over salaries during the war. TERMINATION REPORT OF THE NATIONAL WAR
LABOR BOARD (1945). During World War II, the War Labor Board, determined to eliminate
"intraplant inequality," analyzed the job content of various "women's jobs" and found that
the compensation rate was far below what the job content indicated. 28 WAR LAB. REP. 666
(1945). After examining the factors of import in job analyses and comparing the differentials
between men's jobs to determine the true value of the factors, the Board determined that
sex alone explained the low wages paid to women. This determination is not substantially
different from the implication in Equal Pay Act cases that a differential in pay for equal
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bate, Congress rejected the comparable work standard by substi-
tuting "equal" for "comparable" in the text of the bill. s18  Congress-
man Goodell, a floor manager of the bill, 87 expressed the purpose
of the substitution as ensuring "that the jobs involved should be
virtually identical, that is, very much alike, or closely related to
each other.'" 18 In furtherance of this intent, the sponsors of the
bill carefully created limits on the power of the Labor Department,
the agency initially charged with enforcing the act,8 " to prevent
the agency from rating unequal jobs.190
jobs is attributable to sex, except that in War Labor Board cases the standard for determin-
ing the pay differential was that of comparable rather than equal jobs.
186. 108 CONG. REc. 17,441 (1962). See Gitt & Gelb, supra note 1, at 739.
In the Senate hearings, James B. Carey, Secretary-Treasurer of the AFL-CIO Industrial
Union Department and President of the IBEW, testified that the problem of unequal pay
takes three forms:
(1) paying lower wages to women performing the same job as men;
(2) slightly modifying the man's job and then paying a much lgher rate of pay
than is justified by the modification;
(3) paying women lower wages irrespective of the value, skill, effort of the jobs
in relation to that expended in men's jobs, regardless of whether the jobs are
similar.
Carey testified that the AFL-CIO supported the proposed equal pay bill and believed it
would outlaw all three types of discrimination. See Hearings on S. 7444 Before the Sub-
comm. on Labor of the Senate Labor-Public Welfare Comm., 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 76 (1963).
187. In general, courts give little weight to congressional dialogue in ascertaining legisla-
tive intent. See Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 198-202 (1974). Courts have
looked, however, to statements made in floor debates when made by the chairman of the
committee reporting the bill or the sponsor of the bill. Both Goodell and Griffin were spon-
sors of the Equal Pay Act.
Sponsors' statements are examined more closely on the assumption that sponsors have
special knowledge of the intent behind the statutory words because they have been working
with the bill as it moves through the congressional process. See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347
U.S. 522 (1954) (McCarran's statements concerning the McCarran Act); United States v.
UMW, 330 U.S. 258 (1947) (LaGuardia's statements concerning the Norrs-LaGuardia Act).
188. 109 CONG. REc. 9197 (1963) (remarks of Rep. Goodell). In the continuing debates,
the representatives illustrated their aim in specifying the equal pay for equal work standard:
There would be no basis for comparing an inspector with an assembler
The Department of Labor could not say how these two jobs involve the
same level of skill and the same degree of responsibility. It would be appropri-
ate to compare inspectors with inspectors but not to compare an inspector
with an assembler.
Id. (remarks of Rep. Griffin).
189. For a more extensive discussion of the adniffijrative apparatus responsible for deal-
ing with sex-based wage discrimination claims see notes 223-225 & accompanying text infra.
190. "We do not expect the Labor Department people to go into an establishment and
rate jobs that are not equal. They should not say, 'Well, they amount to the same thing,'
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Moreover, Mr. Goodell sought to assuage the fears of American
business interests by emphasizing the limited nature of the con-
straints the Equal Pay Act would place on employers' freedom of
decisionmaking:
[I]t is our intention .. .to provide [by] the use of [the] terms
'skill, effort, responsibility and working conditions' a maximum
area for the interplay of intangible factors that justify a mea-
surement which does not have to be given a point-by-point eval-
uation. In this concept we want the private enterprise system,
employers and employees and a union ... to have a maximum
degree of discretion in working out the evaluation of the em-
ployee's work and how much he should be paid for it. 91
When one views the statement of purpose underlying the Equal
Pay Act in conjunction with the narrow scope of the Act, one logi-
cally must conclude that Congress intended the Equal Pay Act to
prohibit sexually discriminatory compensation to the greatest ex-
tent possible, but only in accord with the standard it articulated.
As noted by the court in Gunther, the statute failed to address
intentionally discriminatory schemes, which are protected to the
extent the schemes avoid the equal pay for equal work formula.19 2
Legislative History of Title VII
Unlike the Equal Pay Act, which was confined to the narrow
area of wage discrimination, Congress drafted Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 broadly to include a variety of forms of discrim-
ination.""3 Thus, Congress' intent in enacting the Equal Pay Act
cannot bear much weight in determining the meaning of Title
and evaluate them so they come up to the same skill or point." 109 CONG. REc. 9197 (1963)
(remarks of Rep. Goodell).
191. Id. Congress did not want to "authorize the Secretary or the courts to engage in
wholesale reevaluation of any employer's pay structure in order to enforce their own concep-
tions of economic worth." Brennan v. Prince William Hosp. Corp., 503 F.2d 282, 285 (4th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 972 (1975). Similarly, Representative Landrum stated that
he wanted to avoid "the trooping around all over the country of employees of the Labor
Department harassing business with their various interpretations of the term 'comparable'
." 108 CONG. REC. 14,768 (1962).
192. Gunther v. County of Wash., 602 F.2d 882, 890 & n.9 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. granted,
49 U.S.L.W. 3332 (1980) (No. 80-429); see IUE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 23 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 588, 590, 592, 598 (3d Cir. 1980).
193. For the relevant text of Title VII, see note 80 supra.
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VII.194 Also, in contrast to the lengthy consideration given to the
adoption of the Equal Pay Act,195 Congress never discussed the sex
discrimination provisions of Title VII in formal hearings.198 The
word "sex" was not added until the last day of consideration of the
bill in the House Rules Committee.1 9 7
The Senate, which debated and examined the bill at great length
after the House passed it, understood the far-reaching impact of
the inclusion of sex in the bill. The interpretive memorandum sub-
mitted by Senators Clark and Case, the floor managers, stated:
[I]t has been suggested that the concept of discrimination is
vague. In fact it is clear and simple and has no hidden meanings.
To discriminate is to make a distinction, to make a difference in
treatment or favor, and those distinctions or differences in treat-
ment or favor which are prohibited by [section 703] are those
which are based on any five of the forbidden criteria: race, color,
religion, sex and national origin. 98
Congress' treatment of intentional discrimination clearly reveals
the desire to distinguish Title VII from the Equal Pay Act. Unlike
the Equal Pay Act, Title VII explicitly prohibits intentional dis-
crimination, whatever its form. In the first sentence of section
703(h), Congress twice specified that certain practices otherwise
permissible became unlawful if perpetrated with an intention to
discriminate. 199 The critically important protection for seniority
rights in section 703(h) of Title VII contains the express limitation
194. In the field of employment discrimination Congress has a general intent to establish
independent rather than exclusive remedies. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S.
36, 47 (1974); Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974).
195. See notes 188-192 & accompanying text supra.
196. See 109 CONG. REC. 3245 (1963); id. at 11,174 (1963); Gitt & Gelb, supra note 1, at
743.
197. The Rules Committee defeated by an 8 to 7 vote the motion to include sex in the
bill. 20 CONG. Q. 344 (1964). After two weeks of debate on various topics, Rep. Smith, an
opponent of the bill, proposed the amendment adding "sex" one day before the bill passed.
110 CONG. R.c. 2577 (1964).
A number of commentators believe the inclusion of "sex" was merely a diversionary tactic
intended to defeat the bill. See, e.g., Kanowitz, supra note 48, at 310-44; Miller, Sex Dis-
crimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 51 MINN. L. REV. 877 (1967);
Vaas, Title VII; Legislative History, 7 B.C. INn. & CoMM. L. REV. 431 (1966); Note, Sex
Discrimination in Employment, 1968 DuE L.J. 671, 677 n.36.
198. 110 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964).
199. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(h) (1976).
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depriving any seniority system of protection if "it is established or
maintained as the result of an intention to discriminate.20 0 Section
703(h) also provides that personnel decisions and wage differen-
tials based on merit systems or systems measuring earnings by
quantity or quality of production are permissible under Title VII
so long as they are free of discriminatory intent. 0 1 As the Supreme
Court said in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 2 0 2 "in enact-
ing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress intended to
prohibit all practices in whatever form which create inequality in
employment opportunity due to discrimination on the basis of
race, religion, sex, or national origin."203
The decisions of the courts of appeals have emphasized the im-
portance of construing Title VII so as to effect the policy of eradi-
cating discrimination.2 04 In Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co.,205
the Fifth Circuit stated:
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act provides us with a clear
mandate from Congress that no longer will the U.S. tolerate this
form of discrimination. It is, therefore, the duty of the courts to
make sure that the Act works, and that the intent of Congress is
not hampered by a combination of strict construction of the
statute and a battle with semantics.2 06
In light of Title VII's language and legislative history, and in
light of the courts' uniform recognition that Congress intended Ti-
200. Id. Senator Tower offered Amendment No. 605, which would have immunized em-
ployers who used professionally developed ability tests, if the tests were administered to all
applicants or employees regardless of race, religion, sex, and national origin. 110 CONG. REC.
11,251 (1964). The amendment was defeated. Id. at 13,504-05.
Senator Tower later added language to the amendment as follows: "provided that such a
test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to dis-
criminate." The Senate then adopted the amendment as changed. Id. at 13,724. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
201. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
202. 424 U.S. 746 (1976).
203. Id. at 763 (emphasis added).
204. See Bell v. Brown, 557 F.2d 849, 853 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Davis v. Valley Distrib. Co.,
522 F.2d 827, 832 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1090 (1977); Tipler v. E.I. du Pont
de Nemours Co., 443 F.2d 125, 131 (6th Cir. 1971); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
433 F.2d 421, 425 (8th Cir. 1970); Johnson v. Seaboard Airline R.R., 405 F.2d 645, 651-52
(4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 918 (1969).
205. 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970).
206. Id. at 891.
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tle VII to sweep broadly against all forms of discrimination in em-
ployment, a heavy burden rests on any litigant who contends that
the statute does not reach some particular form of race or sex dis-
crimination by a covered employer. To reach a result so at variance
with the broad thrust of the statute, one must find support in ex-
plicit unambiguous language in the statute or in its legislative
history.2 07
The 1972 Amendments to Title VII confirmed the intent to
broadly proscribe all forms of discrimination against women in
compensation, not merely those that are the most blatant. °0 Both
Houses of Congress stated that one of their major concerns was to
eliminate the wage disparities caused by pervasive, complex, and
subtle discrimination against women in employment.09
This Note thus far has stressed the expansive scope of Title VII
and the restrained focus of the Equal Pay Act. Congress designed
the Bennett Amendment to link the two statutes and to explicate
the proper overlap of the statutes in the area of sex-based wage
discrimination. Congress' failure to clarify its designs for dealing
with discrimination in compensation impaired the Bennett
Amendment's ability to accomplish its purpose. An examination of
the legislative history of the Bennett Amendment offers insight
into congressional aims underlying its adoption.
207. Gunther v. County of Wash., 602 F.2d 882, 890 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 49
U.S.L.W. 3332 (1980) (No. 80-429). "[T]he broad remedial policy behind Title VII per-
suades us that Title VII's plain language should not be limited further in the absence of a
clear congressional directive." Id. at 890.
208. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976), as amended by Act of Mar. 24, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261,
§ 701(e), 86 Stat. 103, 113 (1972). The legislative history provides as follows:
Women are subject to economic deprivation as a class. Their self-fulfillment
and development is frustrated because of their sex. Numerous studies have
shown that women are placed in the less challenging, the less responsible and
the less remunerative positions on the basis of their sex alone.
Such blatantly disparate treatment is particularly objectionable in view of
the fact that Title VII has especially prohibited sex discrimination since its
enactment in 1964.
H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2137, 2140.
209. See H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. -, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2137, 2139-41.
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Legislative History of the Bennett Amendment
The Bennett Amendment constitutes the third part of section
703(h) of Title VII.210 Prompted by concern over the possibility of
conflict between Title VII and the Equal Pay Act, Senator Bennett
introduced an amendment during cloture imposed after the floor
debate.211 Senator Benett stated that the purpose of the amend-
ment was to prevent the nullification of the Equal Pay Act in the
event of conflicts. 2
The context in which Senator Bennett offered his amendment 21s
strongly suggests that he did not intend it to limit the substantive
reach of section 703(a)(1), but rather to ensure that conflicts be-
tween the statutes never arose. Conflicts could occur when both
statutes were applicable, such as in situations in which equal work
as defined by the Equal Pay Act is involved, but in which the de-
fenses available under the Equal Pay Act might not be available
under Title VII. In order to avoid such conflicts, the Bennett
Amendment incorporates the Equal Pay Act defenses into Title
VII. As Senator Dirksen, the only senator besides Senator Bennett
to discuss the amendment on the Senate floor, explained before its
passage, "all that the pending amendment does is recognize those
exceptions that are carried in the basic act. '214 He described this
bill as merely a "clarification. '215
Nothing on the face of the amendment was inconsistent with the
previous understanding of the interaction of the Equal Pay Act
and Title VII. The Equal Pay Act would continue to have vitality
in its own sphere without regard to the new mechanisms set up by
Title VII. Further, Title VII clearly went far beyond the scope of
the Equal Pay Act because it did not contain the same jurisdic-
210. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(h) (1976). For text of the amendment, see text accompanying note
163 supra.
211. 110 CONG. REc. 13,327 (1964).
212. Id. at 13,647.
213. On April 25, 1964, the Wage-Hour Administrator of the U.S. Department of Labor
issued the Interpretative Bulletin on Equal Pay for Equal Work, an extensive elaboration of
Equal Pay Act standards and defenses. 29 Fed. Reg. 5548 (1964). On June 12, 1964, only
seven weeks later, Senator Bennett offered his amendment.
214. 110 CONG. REc. 12,722 (1964).
215. Id.
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tional limitations as the Equal Pay Act,216 and it prohibited types
of discrimination not addressed by the Equal Pay Act.217
In light of this legislative history, Senator Humphrey and the
leadership guiding the bill through Congress accepted the Bennett
Amendment,218 which then passed by voice vote rather than roll
216. See note 176 supra.
217. Under the Equal Pay Act, employers who wished to avoid paying women equal wages
could refuse them employment or terminate them. See note 46 supra. Title VII prohibits
such practices. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
The understanding that Title VII went beyond the Equal Pay Act was set forth by
Senator Clark, one of the floor managers of Title VII in the Senate, who responded on the
floor of the Senate to concerns about a possible conflict between Title VII and the Equal
Pay Act:
Objection. The sex anti-discrimination provisions of the bill duplicate the cov-
erage of the EPA of 1963. But more than this, they extend far beyond the
scope and coverage of the Equal Pay Act. They do not include the limitations
in the act with respect to equal work on jobs requiring equal skills in the same
establishments, and thus cut across different jobs.
Answer. The Equal Pay Act is part of the wage hour law, with different cover-
age and with numerous exemptions unlike title VII. Furthermore, under title
VII, jobs can no longer be classified as to sex, except where there is a rational
basis for discrimination on the ground of bona fide occupational qualification.
The standards in the Equal Pay Act for determining discrimination as to
wages, of course are applicable to the comparable situation under title VII.
110 CONG. REC. 7217 (1964) (emphasis added). Senator Clark's words could be understood
as meaning that Title VII is only as broad as the Equal Pay Act. In the alternative, Senator
Clark could have intended that when equal work challenges are made, the affirmative de-
fenses of the Equal Pay Act would be applicable whether the claim was raised under the
Equal Pay Act or Title VII. The passages are helpful in suggesting that some interest in
Congress existed as to the relationship of the two acts prior to the passage of the Bennett
Amendment. On balance, the quoted language supports the broad interpretation of the
Amendment.
218. 110 CONG. REC. 13,647 (1964). The leadership of the bill had refused to agree to even
innocuous amendments that might have had a weakening effect. Between June 4 and June
17, the date the Senate approved the Act, the Senate rejected 23 amendments.
On June 9, the Senate debated and rejected Amendments 606 and 898. Id. at 13,073-93.
On June 11, the Senate debated and rejected Amendments 569 and 605. Id. at 13,490-505.
On June 12, the Senate debated and rejected Amendments 582, 607 and 962. Id. at 13,648-
52, 13,667-69. On June 13, the Senate debated and rejected Amendment 963. Id. at 13,696-
97. On June 15, the Senate debated and rejected Amendments 519 and 547. Id. at 13,825-26,
13,837-38. On June 16, the Senate debated and rejected Amendments 550, 846, 855, and
1020. Id. at 13,910, 13,943-47. On June 17, the Senate debated and rejected Amendments
590, 847, 922, 1021, 1022, 1023, and 1024. Id. at 14,179-97. Among the amendments were
matters such as the permanent restriction of Title VII's coverage to establishments with 100
or more employees and Senator Tower's original testing amendment. Amendment No. 606,
id. at 13,073-93; Amendment No. 605, id. at 13,490-505.
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call.219 The Senate would not have found any measure intended to
immunize intentional discrimination "fully acceptable," and would
not have permitted it to pass without real debate or roll call vote.
Morever, Senators Bennett's and Dirksen's descriptions of the
amendment were not characterizations of a bill designed to carve
out a drastic exception to section 703 that would render sex dis-
crimination in compensation lawful unless prohibited by the Equal
Pay Act. Thus, before the Senate adopted the Bennett Amend-
ment,22 ° the Equal Pay Act and Title VII were separate and inde-
pendent in scope; upon adoption of the Bennett Amendment, the
standards of the Equal Pay Act for determining wage discrimina-
tion applied to Title VII actions involving allegations of equal
work. In assessing the interaction of the two statutes, the Ninth
Circuit in Gunther stated:
EPA standards apply in Title VII suits when plaintiffs raise a
claim of equal pay. When plaintiffs raise a claim under Title VII
of discriminatory compensation in the absence of an allegation
that they perform substantially equal work, no conflict with the
EPA arises, because the EPA is inapplicable. 21
Like the analysis of the language of the relevant legislation, the
preceding investigation of the legislative histories of the Equal Pay
Act, Title VII, and the Bennett Amendment does not reveal con-
gressional intentions lucidly. Although no one piece of information
holds the key to revealing congressional aims, the weight of the
legislative history and the language of the statutes favor the broad
interpretation of the Bennett Amendment.
219. Id. at 13,647.
220. A year after the bill was passed, Senator Bennett described the chaotic conditions
under which his amendment was proposed and adopted.
On 2 days, June 16 and 17, 1964, there were 56 roll call votes on amendments
which were properly before the Senate. Those 56 votes proceeded in an atmo-
sphere of complete chaos because most of the amendments had already used
up so much of their allotted hour of debate that there was barely time avail-
able to discuss them. This resulted in action by the Senate without the crea-
tion of any legislative history ....
Id. at 13,359. Senator Bennett's observations only underscore the obvious, that the meager
colloquy accompanying his amendment cannot support the exemption of major discrimina-
tory compensation practices from the reach of Title VII.
221. 602 F.2d 882, 891 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3332 (1980) (No. 80-
429).
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The courts in Gunther and IUE, however, did not rely solely on
linguistic or historical evaluations to support their legal conclu-
sions. Both the Ninth and Third Circuits consulted the interpreta-
tions of administrative agencies responsible for enforcing the legis-
lation and judicial case law touching on the issue of equal pay for
comparable work.222
ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATIONS
Congress has created a number of administrative agencies to ad-
dress the problem of sex discrimination.2 Initially the Equal Em-
222. IUE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 588, 596-98 (3d Cir.
1980); Gunther v. County of Wash., 602 F.2d 882, 890-91 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 49
U.S.L.W. 3332 (1980) (No. 80-429).
223. The differing responsibilities and enforcement procedures of the EEOC and the
Labor Department provide the potential plaintiff with various avenues to process his com-
plaint. To aid in the administration of Title VII, Congress created the EEOC. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-4 (1976). Although the original version of Title VII did not contain any specific
requirements, the Supreme Court held that an individual must initiate his charge of dis-
crimination with the EEOC before bringing it to the attention of the courts. Love v. Pull-
man Co., 404 U.S. 522, 523 (1972). Under the original version of Title VII, the EEOC had no
enforcement function other than the voluntary compliance it could induce. See, e.g., Steb-
bins v. Continental Ins. Co., 442 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Beverly v. Lone Star Lead Con-
str. Corp., 437 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1971); Johnson v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 405 F.2d 645
(4th Cir. 1968).
In considering the initial creation of the EEOC, the Committees on Education and Labor
in the House favored stronger enforcement measures. Their proposal for NLRB-like proce-
dures suffered defeat because of congressional fear of agency interference in private deci-
sionmaking. See Blumrosen, Processing Employment Discrimination Cases, 90 MoNTHLY
LAB. REv. 25 (1967); Kanowitz, supra note 48, at 318-19.
During the past decade under the Equal Pay Act, the courts have had consid-
erably greater opportunity to reveal their response to sex discrimination than
has been the case under Title VII. This is because from the start of the EPA,
the Secretary of Labor had authority to seek court enforcement, including ex-
plicitly restitution of back pay.
Margolin, Management-Union Confrontation 1972 New Frontiers: Against Women?, 25
N.Y.U. CoNF. LAB. 205, 220 (1970); see Davidson, "Back Pay" Awards under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 26 RuTmFs L. Rxv. 741 (1973).
The passage of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act altered the administrative situa-
tion. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) to (j)
(1976)). The act amended Title VII, but retained the general scheme of the prior law, re-
quiring the initial conciliation process through EEOC auspices. As amended, Title VII also
now authorizes the EEOC, in cases involving discriminatory practices in the private sector,
to bring a civil action against a respondent when it cannot conciliate. The ability to bring a
civil action will increase the volume of sex discrimination litigation under Title VII. Ross &
McDermott, The Equal Pay Act of 1963, 16 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REv. 1 (1974).
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ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was to administer Ti-
tle VII,224 and the Department of Labor was to enforce the Equal
Pay Act by virtue of its status as an amendment to the FLSA.2 25
Both agencies promulgated guidelines that the courts consulted in
interpreting the scope of relevant legislation governing sex
discrimination.
Generally, in applying legislative provisions to varying factual
situations, courts must give "great deference" to the regulations of
the administrative agencies charged with enforcement of those pro-
visions.228 As stated by the Supreme Court in Skidmore v. Swift,227
the regulations serve "as a practical guide to employers and em-
ployees as to how the office representing the public interest in en-
forcement of the law will seek to apply it. ''228
Initially charged with enforcement of the Equal Pay Act, the La-
bor Department 2 9 promulgated its own guidelines in the area of
sex-based wage discrimination. The agency's interpretations of the
Equal Pay Act's relationship to other pay laws finds expression in
a 1967 bulletin that reads:
[T]he provisions of various State or other equal pay laws may
224. The Civil Rights Act created the EEOC to enforce the statute's equal employment
provisions, but Congress gave it neither formal rulemaking power nor adjudicatory power.
See General Elec. Corp. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976); 42 U.S.C. § 20 00e-4(a) to (g)
(1976).
225. On July 1, 1979, the EEOC received jurisdiction for government enforcement of the
Equal Pay Act from the Department of Labor. Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1978, 48 Fed. Reg.
19,807, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app., at 289 (Supp. II 1978). Prior to the transfer, the Depart-
ment of Labor filed a memorandum in the district court in IUE v. Westinghouse supporting
the position of plaintiffs. The Department of Justice originally had jurisdiction over all
"pattern or practice" suits to enforce Title VII, and retains enforcement jurisdiction with
respect to state and local governments. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
226. See Hodgson v. Coming Glass Works, 474 F.2d 226, 232 (2d Cir. 1973), aff'd, 417
U.S. 188 (1974) (mem.). See also Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
Brennan v. Prince William Hosp. Corp., 503 F.2d 282, 287-88 n.5 (4th Cir. 1974).
The Supreme Court has stated that EEOC interpretations of Title VII are entitled to
"great deference." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971). Since Griggs, the
Court has qualified its pronouncement when confronted with EEOC guidelines that conflict
with earlier guidelines on the same topic. See Trans World Airlines Inc. v. Hardison, 432
U.S. 63, 76 n.11 (1976); General Elec. Corp. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976).
227. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
228. Id. at 138; accord Irwin v. Clark, 400 F.2d 882, 884 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 103 (1969); see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
229. See note 225 & accompanying text supra.
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differ from the equal pay provisions set forth in the
[FLSA].... No provisions of the [FLSA] will excuse noncom-
pliance with any State or other law establishing equal pay stan-
dards higher than the equal pay standards provided by section
6(d) of the [FLSA]. 30
Clearly the Labor Department approves the use of antidiscrimina-
tion laws other than the Equal Pay Act. Although not directly in-
terpreting the Bennett Amendment, the Labor Department bulle-
tin left open the possibility that Title VII might establish a higher
equal pay standard.
1965 Guidelines
In 1965 the EEOC promulgated a guideline interpreting the
scope of the Bennett Amendment: 231
Title VII requires that its provisions be harmonized with the
Equal Pay Act in order to avoid conflicting interpretations or
requirements with respect to situations to which both statutes
are applicable. Accordingly the Commission interprets 703(h) to
mean that standards of equal pay for equal work set forth in the
EPA for determining what is unlawful discrimination in com-
pensation are applicable to Title VII.232
This guideline is open to two interpretations. The district court in
IUE reasoned that the guidelines intended that the Equal Pay Act
standard control all sex-based wage discrimination cases, whether
230. 29 C.F.R. § 800.160 (1979).
231. 30 Fed. Reg. 14,925, 14,928 (1965) (formerly codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.7 (1965)).
232. Id. The guideline continued:
However, it is the judgment of the Commission that the employee coverage of
the prohibition against discrimination in compensation because of sex is co-
extensive with that of the other provisions in section 703, and is not limited by
section 703(h) to those employees covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act.
(b) Accordingly the Commission will make applicable to equal pay complaints
filed under Title VII the relevant interpetations of the Administrator, Wage
and Hour Division, Dept. of Labor.... Relevant opinions of the Administra-
tor interpreting "the equal pay for equal work standard" will also be adopted
by the Commission.
(c) The Commission will consult with the Administrator before issuing an
opinion on any matter covered by both Title VII and the Equal Pay Act.
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a claim were raised under either the Equal Pay Act or Title VII.2 3
Conversely, the Third Circuit in IUE and the Ninth Circuit in
Gunther determined that the 1965 guidelines were intended to ap-
ply only to situations in which both statutes are applicable-that
is, equal pay standards control only if equal work complaints arise
under either statute.
After publication of the 1965 guidelines, the EEOC issued a
number of decisions in "comparable work cases." The tenor of
these decisions indicates that the EEOC did not deem a finding of
"equal work" necessary to state a claim of wage discrimination
based on sex under Title VII.23 4 The EEOC considered the avail-
ability of a defense under the Bennett Amendment, but rejected it:
Section 6(d) of the [FLSA] "authorizes" a pay differential for
equal work when certain conditions are met. Here we are not
concerned with a situation encompassed by the Equal Pay Act
in that "equal work" is not involved. Our concern is with policy
which we have found is being administered by Respondent Em-
ployer in a manner intended to provide benefits to males with-
out providing equivalent benefits to females.
Since the policy at issue here is not within the intended
scope of the Equal Pay Act, it clearly cannot be "authorized" by
the Act within the meaning of Section 703(h) of Title VII.' "s
In a number of these cases, the EEOC found discrimination pre-
sent when the employer created lower pay scales for jobs held
predominantly by women in sex-segregated work forces.2 36 Thus,
the Commission's consistent position has been that the depression
of wages for females in sex-segregated jobs constitutes a violation
of Title VII.
233. IUE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 450, 452-53 (D.N.J. 1979),
rev'd, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 588 (3d Cir. 1980).
234. The EEOC found violations when predominantly female and predominantly male
job classifications were compensated differently, purportedly on the basis of local prevailing
wage standards. See Dec. No. 71-2629, [1973] EEOC Dec. (CCH) 4536 (1971); Dec. No. 70-
695, [1973] EEOC Dec. (CCH) 4253 (1970); Dec. No. 70-112, [1973] EEOC Dec. (CCH) 4159
(1969).
235. Dec. No. 71-2629, [1973] EEOC Dec. (CCH) 4536, 4539 (1971).
236. See authorities cited note 234 supra.
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1972 Guidelines
In 1972 the EEOC promulgated a second guideline that read:
(a) The employee coverage of the prohibitions against discrim-
ination based on sex contained in Title VII are co-extensive with
that of the other prohibitions contained in Title VII ....
(b) By virtue of section 703(h) a defense based on the EPA
may be raised in a proceeding under Title VII.237
The district court in IUE noted that "[t]he 1972 guideline is not
expressly inconsistent with the 1965 ruling, in that it doesn't reject
the 'equal work' formula .. .but the implication is clear. The
Commission's omission of language expressly incorporating the
equal work formula is intended to show that the Commission now
disapproves of that language. ' '238 In language more explicit than
the 1965 guidelines, the 1972 guidelines support the broad inter-
pretation of the Bennett Amendment. The guidelines speak of sex
discrimination in the same terms as other forms of discrimination.
Moreover, the decisions of the EEOC under the 1965 guideline
clearly establish that the purpose of the 1965 guideline was merely
to ensure that equal pay standards controlled equal pay claims
filed under Title VII. No inconsistency is apparent between the
1965 guideline and the 1972 guideline; therefore, the 1972 guide-
line is entitled to "greater deference" by the courts.2 3 In addition,
the courts accord great deference to administrative interpretations
that an agency has maintained over a substantial period of time.240
The EEOC consistently has interpreted the Bennett Amendment
to render Title VII independent of the Equal Pay Act. Therefore
the 1972 guidelines ought to receive prominence in judicial consid-
eration of "equal pay for comparable work" decisions.
Following the 1972 regulations, the EEOC continued to articu-
late and to further the acceptance of the broad interpretation of
the Bennett Amendment. The transfer of power over the Equal
237. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.8 (1979). "Where such a defense is raised the Commission will give
appropriate consideration to the interpretations of [the Department of Labor], but will not
be bound thereby." Id.
238. IUE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 450, 455 (D.N.J. 1979),
rev'd, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 588 (3d Cir. 1980).
239. See Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 142-43 n.4 (1977).
240. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
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Pay Act from the Labor Department to the EEOC aided in this
activity. 4' Shortly after the transfer became effective, the EEOC
announced that it would not adopt the former Labor Department
guidelines interpreting the Equal Pay Act, but that it would issue
its own interpretations later in 1978.242
The EEOC has emphasized that a primary concern of the agency
in drafting regulations pursuant to its transferred authority is the
proper interpretation of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII.24s EEOC
Vice-chairman Daniel Leach stated:
The EEOC reads the language of the Bennett Amendment and
the underlying legislative history to mean that Congress under-
stood that discrimination is often subtle and complex-and in-
tended the law to root out and remedy the discrimination which
is not readily apparent. This agency reads this to mean that Ti-
tle VII is broad enough to reach this form of wage inequality.24'
The EEOC's commissioning of the National Academy of Sciences
(NAS) to conduct studies relative to wage rate discrimination sup-
ports the inference that the EEOC will attempt to prove underval-
uation of female employment according to a "comparable worth"
241. In an attempt to centralize governmental enforcement of federal equal employment
legislation, President Carter transferred to the EEOC authority to enforce the Equal Pay"
Act provisions. The measure was adopted pursuant to the Reorganization Plan No. 1 of
1968, 3 C.F.R. 1061 (1966-1970 compilation), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app., at 817 (1976),
which grants to the executive the power to reorganize agencies in the interest of governmen-
tal efficiency. Id. In the following request for comment, the Commission itself highlighted
the significance of this transfer of authority to the specific issues considered in this Note.
On July 1, 1979, the Commission assumed jurisdiction over the Equal Pay
Act pursuant to Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978. For the first time, the
Commission is responsible for the orderly and harmonious interpretation of
both the Equal Pay Act and Title VII as they relate to discrimination on the
basis of sex.
• . . [B]y and large, neither the Equal Pay Act nor the more general prohibi-
tion of Title VII on employment discrimination because of ... sex ... have
been applied to the question of wage rates paid for jobs into which minorities
and women have been traditionally segregated.
44 Fed. Reg. 63,485 (1979). See also 104 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 1, at 2 (May 5, 1980).
242. DAiLY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 134 (July 11, 1979).
243. See 44 Fed. Reg. 63,485 (1979). See also 104 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 1, at 2 (May
5, 1980).
244. 2 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 1 5070 (1978).
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standard.245 Employees should receive equal pay for work of equal
value to the employer, based on an objective assessment of
value.2
46
The characteristics of the NAS proposed job evaluation plan 47
further the broad interpretation of the Bennett Amendment. For
example, the guidelines encourage comparison of wage rates and
job worth of any pair of jobs in an enterprise.2 48 The guidelines
make no mention of equal job content as a prerequisite in evaluat-
ing the relative worth of differing types of employment.249 More-
over, the NAS asserts that the means to eliminate the subtle dis-
crimination and undervaluation of women's work is to have job
evaluation systems that clearly delineate the criteria for measuring
the worth of a job. 50 Once dissemination of these criteria occurs,
the employee will know what the specific requisites are for earning
a particular level of income, regardless of the differing types of jobs
included in the evaluation process. Therefore, the NAS job evalua-
tion plan emphasizes the necessity for litigating equal pay for com-
parable work cases.
The evolution of the EEOC's position reflects the progress and
problems of women in employment during the seventeen years
since the Equal Pay Act was enacted. The superficially simple rem-
edy of equal pay for equal work has proved to be ill-equipped to
respond to many of the formidable barriers faced by women enter-
ing, reentering, or attempting to improve their position in the na-
tion's work force. The persistently lower average salary of women
compared to the average salary of men testifies to the limitations
of the Equal Pay Act.2 5' The present EEOC focus on undervalua-
tion, however, may also be indicative of progress. Unequal pay for
245. In June 1980, the NAS proposed guidelines for the construction of equitable job
evaluation plans appeared. Although the report emphasizes that the guidelines are proposed
only to help those employers who are voluntarily assessing the equity of their job evaluation
procedures, it offers employers a thinly veiled ultimatum-follow these guidelines or risk
liability for sex discrimination. See National Academy of Sciences, Draft Guidelines on Job
Evaluation Plans, DAULY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 111, at F-1 to F-8 (June 6, 1980).
246. Id. at F-1.
247. See id. at F-7 to F-8.
248. Id. at F-2 to F-5.
249. Id.
250. Id. at F-4.
251. See Herman, supra note 1, at 195-98.
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equal work is far less prevalent today than in 1963.252 The EEOC is
attempting to address through the reinterpretation of dated legis-
lation an aspect of a problem that may be more social than legal.
Ultimately, the remedy for sex discrimination, a change in atti-
tudes toward female labor, must originate in three areas, congres-
sional legislation, judicial decisions, and administrative agencies, to
ensure effective enforcement of the laws.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
The legislative process is an assuredly gradual source of social
change. As mounting numbers of equal pay for comparable work
cases find their way into the federal judicial system, the subtle
manifestations of employment discrimination will come under in-
creasing judicial scrutiny. Such judicial decisionmaking will have a
more immediate impact on the elimination of sex-based wage dis-
crimination than legislative initiatives.
Most of the cases dealing with sex-based wage discrimination
have not examined the relationship between Title VII and the
Equal Pay Act. 53 Many of the decisions have focused on redefining
the meaning of such Equal Pay Act standards as "job equality"
and "establishment."'2 " Until quite recently the few courts that
had analyzed the relationship between the statutes had viewed the
issues in the context of plaintiffs alleging unequal pay for equal.
work.255 Therefore those courts had not considered the possibility
of extending Title VII beyond the Equal Pay Act by granting relief
to plaintiffs alleging unequal pay for comparable work.
Although an increasing number of decisions have concerned
equal pay for comparable work claims and are continuing to rede-
fine the parameter of the concept, no one case has clearly deline-
252. Id.
253. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,
711-14 (1978) (Title VII litigation); Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974)
(Equal Pay Act litigation).
254. See, e.g., Brennan v. Goose Creek Consol. Independent School Dist., 519 F.2d 53 (5th
Cir. 1975) (establishment issue); Brennan v. Prince William Hosp. Corp., 503 F.2d 282 (4th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 972 (1975) (equality of effort issue); Hodgson v. Brookha-
ven Gen. Hosp., 436 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1970) (equality of effort issue).
255. See, e.g., Roesel v. Joliet Wrought Washer Co., 596 F.2d 183 (7th Cir. 1979); DiSalvo
v. Chamber of Commerce, 568 F.2d 593 (8th Cir. 1978); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,
567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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ated the scope of Title VII's coverage over sex-based wage discrim-
ination. Even the Third Circuit in IUE avoided dealing with the
intricacies of equal pay for comparable work claims.26 Yet the
Third Circuit's decision in IUE v. Westinghouse has found the
best resolution of the problem thus far: expand the scope of Title
VII to subject evidence of intentional discrimination to scrutiny,
but with sufficient limits to prevent the judiciary's unwarranted in-
trusion into employers' labor decisions. A brief overview of the de-
velopment of the case law in the field of sex-based wage discrimi-
nation will explicate the strengths and weaknesses of the equal pay
for comparable work standard.
The cases dealing with sex-based wage discrimination devolve
into three groups: (1) claims alleging unequal pay for equal work
under the Equal Pay Act; (2) claims alleging unequal pay for equal
work under Title VII; and (3) claims alleging unequal pay for com-
parable work under Title VII.
Unequal Pay for Equal Work Under Title VII
A number of cases interpreting the Bennett Amendment have
arisen under Title VII.257 Three courts of appeals have stated that
the plaintiff in a Title VII sex-based wage discrimination case
must show unequal pay for equal work.2 58 The Tenth Circuit in
Ammons v. Zia Co.,259 finding that a female "editor-writer" was
not the victim of sex discrimination, stated that "to establish a
case of discrimination under Title VII one must prove a differen-
tial in pay based on sex, for performing equal work. 2 60
256. See 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 599-600, 604 (Van Dusen, J., dissenting); notes 146-
147 & accompanying text supra.
257. DiSalvo v. Chamber of Commerce, 568 F.2d 593 (8th Cir. 1978); Orr v. Frank R.
MacNeil & Son, Inc., 511 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 65 (1975); Ammonis v.
Zia Co., 448 F.2d 117 (10th Cir. 1971); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 449 F. Supp. 397
(W.D. Pa. 1978) (although plaintiffs alleged unequal pay for comparable work, they also
brought a claim of unequal pay for equal work under Title VII); Mothan v. Temple Univ.,
442 F. Supp. 448 (E.D. Pa. 1977); EEOC v. Colby College, 439 F. Supp. 631 (D. Me. 1977);
Howard v. Ward Co., 418 F. Supp. 494 (D.N.D. 1976).
258. DiSalvo v. Chamber of Commerce, 568 F.2d 593, 596 (8th Cir. 1978); Orr v. Frank R.
MacNeill & Son, Inc., 511 F.2d 166, 171 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 65 (1975); Ammons
v. Zia Co., 448 F.2d 117, 120 (10th Cir. 1971).
259. 448 F.2d 117 (10th Cir. 1971).
260. Id. at 120. In Ammons, the plaintiff worked as an "editor-writer," writing opera-
tional checklists and maintenance procedures. In addition to her writing tasks, she per-
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The decision in Ammons contained no discussion of the language
of the Bennett Amendment or its legislative history, but merely
alluded to it by quoting a part of the Bennett Amendment. More-
over, in each case the plaintiff claimed that although she did equal
work, she was not receiving pay equal to that of male employees." 1
Therefore, the courts did not face the question whether a plaintiff
could establish a Title VII compensation claim in any other way.
Conversely, two appellate courts' decisions support the broad
view of the Bennett Amendment that a female plaintiff can estab-
lish a Title VII claim of sex discrimination in compensation with-
out showing that she performed work equal to that of any male
employee. In Roesel v. Joliet Wrought Washer Co.,26 2 the plaintiff
argued that her job was equal to that of another female employee,
whose pay the employer had raised previously in order to avoid
charges of sex discrimination.2 03 The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff could be the
victim of discrimination in compensation even though she
presented no evidence directly comparing her job with that held by
a man.264 The court held that the employer violated Title VII by
paying the plaintiff a lower salary than it would have paid to a
formed general office chores, such as typing, dictation, and answering the phone. Such du-.
ties required less responsibility than those assigned to higher paid men. Plaintiff's main
allegation was that she was paid less than three men engaged in the same writing tasks. The
district court found that the work plaintiff performed was not the same work male writers
performed. In affirming the lower court, the court of appeals held that in order to establish a
case of discrimination under Title VII, one must prove a differential in pay based on sex for
performing "equal work." Id.
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in Orr v. Frank R. MacNeill & Son, Inc., 511 F.2d 166 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 65 (1975), finding that the duties of the plaintiff as head of the
accounting department were dissimilar to the duties of the heads of other departments,
concluded that the lack of equal work necessarily precluded a finding of sex-based wage
discrimination. Id. at 170-71. The plaintiff offered evidence of sex bias, including testimony
that the employer would never consider paying a woman more than a man. Id. at 171.
See also DiSalvo v. Chamber of Commerce, 568 F.2d 593 (8th Cir. 1978) (Equal Pay Act
and Title VII coextensive).
261. DiSalvo v. Chamber of Commerce, 568 F.2d 593, 595 (8th Cir. 1978); Orr v. Frank R.
MacNeill & Son, Inc., 511 F.2d 166, 168-70 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 65 (1975);
Ammons v. Zia Co., 448 F.2d 117, 118 (10th Cir. 1971).
262. 596 F.2d 183 (7th Cir. 1979).
263. Id. at 186.
264. Id.
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man doing the same work.2 65 Therefore, the court allowed the
plaintiff to prove that discriminatory motivation influenced her
salary, without demanding strict adherence to the equal pay for
equal work standard. 6'
The second appellate court to speak to the issue of "comparable
work" via an equal pay allegation under Title VII was the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Laffey v.
Northwest Airlines.267 In Laffey, the court stated: "The Bennett
Amendment refers specifically to the Equal Pay Act and states
that a sex-predicated wage differential is immune from attack
under Title VII only if it comes within one of the four enumerated
exceptions to the EPA. '268 The court made no mention of the
equal work standard as necessary to a Title VII sex-based wage
discrimination suit. Although the question of the applicability of
the equal work limitation to Title VII turned out to be insignifi-
cant in Laffey because the court found the jobs to be equal, the
District of Columbia Circuit's interpretation of the Bennett
Amendment accords with that of the Ninth and Third Circuits.
Unequal Pay for Comparable Work Under Title VII
Only a limited number of courts have analyzed equal pay for
comparable work issues.26 9 In Christensen v. Iowa 270 plaintiffs
265. Id. at 187.
266. The flexible interpretation of Title VII in Roesel has not been expanded to the
Equal Pay Act. In Rinkel v. Associated Pipeline Contractors, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 224
(D. Ala. 1978), the plaintiff, who held a unique position, contended that the court ought to
allow her to pursue her Equal Pay Act claim despite the lack of an equivalent position. Id.
at 226. She maintained that the comparison contemplated by the Equal Pay Act is only an
evidentiary device designed to enable the jury to determine if an employee's compensation
is unreasonably low. Thus she contended that evidence showing an employer would have
paid a male doing her job higher wages is evidence of discrimination. The court rejected her
theory, stating, "The Equal Pay Act clearly on its face is intended to prevent an employer
from discriminating within any establishment. Thus the comparison referred to in the legis-
lative history ... is not a mere evidentiary device but rather is a part of a substantive claim
for relief." Id. Therefore under the Equal Pay Act, the statute's narrow standards are en-
forced strictly, whereas the broad focus of Title VII mandates an attack against any form of
sex discrimination.
267. 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
268. Id. at 446.
269. See, e.g., Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 449 F. Supp. 397, 400-01 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
270. 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977).
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based their cause of action on an allegation of unequal pay for
comparable work in violation of Title VII.27 1 The female plaintiffs
were clerical workers at a state university who believed that pay-
ment of higher wages to male plant workers of similar seniority
constituted sex discrimination under Title VII.272 The plaintiffs
claimed that the higher payment to male workers perpetuated
wage differences resulting from past societal discrimination.
Longstanding discriminatory practices in the local job market,
which channeled women workers into a small number of jobs,
resulted in an over-supply of workers and depressed wages in
those jobs. Therefore, [the university's] reliance in part upon the
prevailing wage rates in determining beginning pay scales for
jobs of equal worth to the university serves to carry over the
effects of sex discrimination in the marketplace into the wage
policies of the college.273
In response, the university argued that it paid higher wages to
male workers because wages in the local labor market were higher,
and therefore the university had to pay more to attract
applicants. 4
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held
that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the wage differentials
between clerical and plant employees resulted from sex discrimina-
tion rather than from legitimate motives.275 Because of the plain-
tiffs' failure to make out a prima facie case of discrimination, the
court did not resolve conclusively the conflict over the interpreta-
tion of the Bennett Amendment.2 7 6 Nevertheless, the Eighth Cir-
cuit articulated many of the recurrent policy-oriented criticisms of
the broad interpretation of the Bennett Amendment. The court
could not accept a construction of Title VII that would establish a
271. Id. at 354.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 355-56.
274. See id. at 355.
275. Id. "By way of distinction to the facts of the case, we might note that if the record
had established that the university relied on prevailing community wage rates in setting pay
scales for male-dominated jobs but paid less than community wages for jobs primarily
staffed by women, we would necessarily reach the Bennett Amendment issue." Id. at 355
n.5.
276. Id. at 355.
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prima facie violation of Title VII whenever "employees of different
sexes receive disparate compensation for work of differing skills
.... P277 In the court's view, such a construction ignores the mar-
ket reality that wages are not determined solely by the value of a
job to an employer; the supply of workers and the demand for
their services often dictate the employees' level of income.27 8
Therefore, merely demonstrating that two workers of different
sexes receive different income does not prove sex-based wage
discrimination.
In Christensen, the court did not preclude a finding of sex-based
wage discrimination under Title VII if plaintiff presented evidence
of intentional discrimination. Rather, the decision prohibited only
those claims of sex-based wage discrimination that rested solely on
statistics showing wage differentials as proof as discrimination.2 80
In Lemons v. City and County of Denver,281 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit grappled with issues closely
resembling those confronted in Christensen. Seeking reclassifica-
tion of their jobs, nurses employed by the city of Denver argued
that, for the purpose of wage determination, the city should com-
pare their salaries with those of nonnursing positions of equal
worth to the city and not with salaries of other nurses employed in
the community because nurses historically have been undercom-
pensated2 2 The court held that Congress did not intend Title VII
to remedy this type of wage disparity and refused to grant relief.
The courts under existing authority cannot require the city
277. Id. at 356.
278. Id.
279. The court stated:
We find nothing in the text and history of Title VII suggesting that Congress
intended to abrogate the laws of supply and demand or other economic princi-
ples that determine wage rates for various kinds of work. We do not interpret
Title VII as requiring an employer to ignore the market in setting wage rates
for genuninely different work classifications.
Id. (footnoted omitted).
280. Similarly, in Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne College, 552 F.2d 579 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 904 (1977), the court held that mere proof that the average pay of male college
professors exceeded the average pay of female college professors did not establish a prima
facie violation of Title VII. In this case, the court required "substantial equality" between
the jobs under comparison. Id. at 580.
281. 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 959 (10th Cir. 1980).
282. Id. at 959.
1981]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
within its employment to reassess the worth of services in each
position in relation to all others, to strike a new balance in the
relationship. . . . Plaintiffs herein are not seeking equality of
opportunity for their skills as contemplated by Title VII . . .
but would instead cross job description lines in areas of entirely
different skills.283
By denying relief in the absence of proof of intentional discrimina-
tion, the courts in Christensen and Lemons acknowledged the
need for some limitation on a Title VII cause of action alleging
unequal pay for comparable work. Without a narrowly defined
cause of action, the floodgates would open to allow discrimination
claims based on all types of job comparisons.8 4 Other courts like-
wise have achieved this narrowing by allowing only those claims
turning on intentional discrimination. In Fitzgerald v. Sirloin
Stockade, 5 the Tenth Circuit allowed a plaintiff to prove discrim-
ination without the equal work standard because she presented ex-
tensive evidence of the intentionally discriminatory practices of
her employer.286 The court did not construe the Bennett Amend-
ment as making the Equal Pay Act coextensive with Title VII, but
neither did the court allow litigation of all claims of equal pay for
comparable work. Rather, the Tenth Circuit struck the balance
eventually adopted by the Third Circuit that evidence of inten-
tional discrimination may provide the basis for a cause of action
under Title VII without the equal pay for equal work standard.28
Unlike the Third Circuit, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Gun-
ther did not adopt a restrained approach. The Ninth Circuit's ini-
tial decision in Gunther contained a holding so broad as to allow a
plaintiff to litigate any type of discrimination under Title VII.288
After Gunther, courts almost certainly would compare different
283. Id. at 959-60.
284. "I am unable to believe that the Congress of the United States has mandated that
every person in the U.S. be evaluated skillwise, productive-wise and otherwise to the job of
every other person, and they have a completely new pay scale set up by some group of
experts. . . ." Lemons v. City & County of Denver, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 906, 909 (D.
Colo. 1978), afl'd, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 959 (10th Cir. 1980).
285. 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 262 (10th Cir. 1980).
286. Id. at 267-68.
287. Id.
288. Gunther v. County of Wash., 602 F.2d 882, 891 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 49
U.S.L.W. 3332 (1980) (No. 80-429).
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types of jobs to discern evidence of discrimination. Subsequently,
the Ninth Circuit recognized the error in such an expansive hold-
ing and, in an opinion denying a petition for rehearing en banc to
the appellants in Gunther, limited its initial stance: "We do note
that, because a comparable work standard cannot be substituted
for an equal work standard, evidence of comparable work, although
not necessarily irrelevant in proving discrimination under some
alternative theory, will not alone be sufficient to establish a prima
facie case. '
The Third Circuit in IUE v. Westinghouse heeded well the
Ninth Circuit's retreat from an overly expansive reading of Title
VII by holding that "intentional discrimination in formulating
classifications of jobs violates Title VII . . .290 By phrasing its
decision in terms of intentional discrimination manifested through
the use of job classification systems, the court attempted to avoid
extreme pronouncements. Because the court recognized the invidi-
ous nature of sex-based wage discrimination, it could not accept an
interpretation of the Bennett Amendment that would protect in-
tentionally discriminatory employment practices. Yet the court
was also aware of the case law preceding its decision and did not
want to repeat the errors of the Ninth Circuit's initial decision in
Gunther.29 Therefore, the Third Circuit's decision allows plaintiffs
to bring a cause of action alleging intentional discrimination, but
does not permit suits based on allegations that an employer dis-
criminated by perpetuating general societal undervaluation of "wo-
men's work. '292
289. 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1651, 1655 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3332
(1980) (No. 80-429).
290. 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 588, 590 (3d Cir. 1980).
291. See id. at 598 & n.18.
292. The primary failure of the Third Circuit's decision was its reluctance to articulate
starkly its position. One could interpret the decision as allowing employees to allege sex-
based wage discrimination founded solely on the evidence that other employees received
higher pay for comparable work. The courts would then be forced to evaluate the worth of
differing types of jobs. 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 588, 598-600 (3d Cir. 1980) (dissenting
opinion). Clearly, the majority's opinion would not allow a plaintiff to prove discrimination
simply by alleging differentials in pay. Rather, the plaintiff must prove that his employer
intentionally discriminated against him via some particular term or condition of employ-
ment. The dissent mistakenly believed that the majority's decision in IUE was as broad as
the Ninth Circuit's initial decision in Gunther. The cause of this misinterpretation lies with
the failure of the Third Circuit to enunciate clearly the rationale for its narrow position.
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POLICY ISSUES
Equal Scrutiny of Sex and Race Discrimination Under Title VII
Whether the Supreme Court will approve the Third Circuit's in-
terpretation of the Bennett Amendment remains to be seen. The
Supreme Court has never addressed itself directly to the proper
interpretation of the amendment. Nevertheless, one may glean
some guidance from the Court's decisions in related areas. For ex-
ample, in Corning Glass Works v. Brennan,2 93 the Court noted
that the Equal Pay Act prohibited paying women less for jobs
identical to those performed by men. Although the Court did not
discuss Title VII implications, its rejection of sex-based "market
forces" as an affirmative defense under the factor-other-than-sex
category""' may lend support to a Title VII argument for the insuf-
ficiency of such an employer justification.
Prominent among the Supreme Court decisions offering gui-
dance is City of Los Angeles, Department of Water & Power v.
Manhart,29 5 showing the Court's equation of sexual and racial dis-
crimination.298 In Manhart, the Court held that an employer can-
not lawfully require female employees to make larger contributions
to its pension fund than its male employees, even though women
on the average live longer than men and therefore likely will re-
The court could have avoided causing further confusion as to the scope of Title VII by
simply stressing the dangers inherent in a "comparable worth" approach. The court's failure
to rebut these concerns left ambiguities in the decision amenable to further misconstruction
by courts in future decisions.
293. 417 U.S. 188 (1974).
294. Id. at 204-05.
295. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
296. The use of Supreme Court treatment of race discrimination to support a Title VII
cause of action alleging unequal pay for comparable work is not novel; courts regularly apply
race discrimination precedents in sex discrimination cases. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977). In Willingham v. Macon-Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th
Cir. 1975), the Fifth Circuit stated:
The language of the Supreme Court in Griggs regarding racial discrimination
applies with equal (but not greater) force to sexual discrimination: "The objec-
tive of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the language of the
statute. It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove
barriers that have operated in the past in favor of an identifiable group of
white employees over other employees."
Id. at 1091 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971)).
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ceive larger pension payments for a longer period of time.9 The
Court observed that such a practice would be plainly unlawful if
based on race: "Actuarial studies could unquestionably identify
differences in life expectancy based on race or national origin, as
well as sex. But a statute that was designed to make race irrelevant
in the employment market could not reasonably be construed to
permit a take-home-pay differential based on a racial classifica-
tion."' 98 Because "Congress had decided that classifications based
on sex, like those based on national origin or race are unlawful,"'299
the Court held that the sex-based differential at issue in Manhart
was likewise unlawful. Discrimination in wages on the basis of sex
is not different in kind from discrimination on the basis of sex in
fixing payments for pension benefits. The Supreme Court holding
that such differentiation violates Title VII thus supports the posi-
tion that allegations of lowered wages on the basis of sex states an
offense under Title VII and that a broad interpretation of the Ben-
nett Amendment is consistent with eradicating such discrimina-
tion. The alternative view, reading the Bennett Amendment as an
incorporation of the equal pay for equal work formula into Title
VII, would provide women with a weaker remedy under Title VII
than is available to blacks or other protected classes.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California recognized the possibility of such a result in Patterson
v. Western Development Laboratories.300 In that case, the court
resolved the problem of different coverage for women and other
protected groups by holding that the Bennett Amendment applied
to race as well as sex claims. 0 1 The result reached in Patterson is
inappropriate because it applied the vague language of a sex dis-
crimination amendment to a situation of race discrimination in
which a sex discrimination provision clearly did not apply. Patter-
son implicitly recognized, however, that the language of Title VII
is broad enough to cover salary discrimination in unequal jobs. The
court also reached the sound conclusion that nothing in Title VII
should serve to provide women with less protection than that pro-
297. 435 U.S. at 709-11.
298. Id. at 709 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971)).
299. Id.
300. 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 772 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
301. Id. at 775.
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vided to other minorities.30 2
In spite of the disparate protection of females that a narrow in-
terpretation of the Bennett Amendment permits, however, other
lower federal courts have avoided broadening Title VII to encom-
pass equal pay for comparable work claims. In Willingham v. Ma-
con-Telegraph Publishing Co.,303 the Fifth Circuit found that the
attenuated history of the sex amendment to Title VII indicated
that Congress probably did not intend for its proscription of sexual
discrimination to have significant and sweeping implications. The
court, therefore, declined to extend the scope of Title VII to situa-
tions of "questionable application" without some stronger congres-
sional mandate.0 4 The United States Courts of Appeals for the
District of Columbia,3 0 5 Second Circuit,308 Fourth Circuit,3 07 Sixth
Circuit,308 and Ninth Circuit s 9 have reached similar results.
Although the narrow approach of these cases is plausible, the
302. Although the bona fide occupational exemption contained in § 703(e) does not apply
to racial discrimination, the exception does apply to discrimination based on religion or
national origin. Furthermore, the bona-fide-occupational-qualification exception applies
only to the hire or employment of workers, and not to compensation. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(e) (1976). The courts and the EEOC have held that the bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion requires a narrow interpretation. See Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Ry., 444 F.2d 1219
(9th Cir. 1971); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(a) (1979). For further discussion, see notes 92-94 & ac-
companying text supra.
303. 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc).
304. Id. at 1090. The court seemed to be struggling to articulate a theory to justify em-
ployer decisions that appear to be reasonable, even though those decisions adversely affect
members of a particular sex. Because sex discriminination was not intended to be addressed
as thoroughly as race discrimination, employers' decisions affecting members of a particular
sex are given more deference than employers' decisions affecting minorities. See id.
For example, in considering challenges to employers' hair grooming codes that establish a
different standard for the hair length of male employees than for female employees, the
court in Willingham held Title VII inapplicable, even though a standard that treats women
differently than men falls within the proscription of Title VII. Id. at 1092. In their haste to
find that Title VII does not prohibit this type of minimal infringement on employment
opportunities, the court resorted to disturbing dicta, which if taken at face value suggest a
cavalier attitude toward sex discrimination in general. See id. at 1090-91. The court in Wil-
lingham should have held that a prima facie case had been made under the statute, but that
the employers' interest justified the hair length requirements.
305. Dodge v. Giant Food Co., 488 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Fagan v. National Cash
Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
306. Longo v. Carlisle De Coppett & Co., 537 F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1976).
307. Earwood v. Continental S.E. Lines, 539 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir. 1976).
308. Barker v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 697 (6th Cir. 1977).
309. Baker v. California Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1974).
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language used in support of the result is dangerous because of its
assumption that the late addition of sex to Title VII permits sex
discrimination to be interpreted more narrowly than the race dis-
crimination cases. Nothing in the legislative history of the sex
amendment indicates that Congress intended such a result.3 10 Any
inferences to that effect were dispelled clearly by the discussions of
sex discrimination in the 1972 amendments to Title VII. Both the
House and Senate committee reports stated: "This committee be-
lieves that women's rights are not judicial divertisements. Discrim-
ination against women is no less serious than other forms of pro-
hibited employment practices and is to be accorded the same
degree of social concern given to any type of unlawful discrimina-
tion."31 Therefore, the only defensible interpretation of the Ben-
nett Amendment and Title VII treats the existence of sexual and
racial discrimination as equally wrong, meriting equal determina-
tion to rid both from American society.32
310. See H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971). See also notes 193-209 & ac-
companying text supra.
311. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971). See also S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. 7-8 (1971).
312. One commentator has observed:
Women continue to be employed largely in the industries that have historically
been their source of employment, such as service, wholesale and retail trade
and public service sectors. Most of the women who went to work in the last ten
years found employment as clerical workers, professional and service workers
other than those in households. They have not made large inroads in the more
technically oriented industries and occupations.
[A] difficult problem, which is voiced increasingly is that of the systemic
and historical undervaluation of work performed by women.
The Equal Pay Act was directed at such undervaluation but only where
women and men were performing essentially the same work in the same estab-
lishment. It did not address the more pervasive discrimination which affects
women who perform work which although different from that traditionally per-
formed by men, is of equal value. An example would be a highly trained wo-
men [sic] court stenographer versus a male compliance officer.
Herman, supra note 1, at 195, 198. See also Gitt & Gelb, supra note 1, at 725-32. Under our
present statutory treatment of sex-based wage discrimination, registered nurses in Denver,
while earning less than Denver house-painters and tree-trimmers, have no legal remedy on a
theory of discrimination in compensation. Washington Post, Nov. 13, 1979; at 85, col.1. The
lesser earning power of women has resulted both from unequal pay for equal work and from
the much subtler social phenomenon that work traditionally performed by women draws
wages inferior to those paid for work performed by men. The Bureau of Labor Statistics
based a wage study on the 1970 census and found that the higher the percentage of women
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When the equal pay for comparable work issue reaches the Su-
preme Court,3' 3 its own precedents in the race discrimination set-
ting and the above statements in the House and Senate committee
reports should inform its decision. At that time the Court ought
not destroy the force of its former statements decrying sex discrim-
ination by adopting a narrow interpretation of the Bennett
Amendment. Rather, the court ought to follow the path of compro-
mise established in IUE, thus reinforcing the value of equal oppor-
tunity without interfering with employers' private decisionmaking.
Economic Objections to the Comparable Work Doctrine
Major obstacles to acceptance of a cause of action alleging une-
qual pay for comparable work are judicial interference with free
market regulation of wages and the lack of objective standards for
comparing jobs and their worth. Claims of traditional undervalua-
tion of "women's work" thus raise numerous practical difficulties
for the courts. In the few instances in which this issue has been
presented directly to the courts, they have responded by address-
ing the exclusion of women from the higher paying male jobs,
rather than by addressing the underpayment that is attendant to
women segregated into women's jobs.$"' The courts' reluctance re-
in any given occupation, the lower the earning level tends to be. See Sommers, Occupa-
tional Rankings for Men and Women by Earnings, 97 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 34, 50 (Aug.
1974).
313. The court granted certiorari in Gunther v. County of Wash., 49 U.S.L.W. 3332 (1980)
(No. 80-429). Although the Court has not specified the proper interpretation of the Bennett
Amendment in an equal pay case, the decision in City of Los Angeles, Department of Water
& Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), addressed similar issues in an analogous context.
The Supreme Court in dicta remarked, "All the Bennett Amendment did was to incorporate
the exemptions of the EPA into Title VII." 435 U.S. 702, 709 (1978). See also notes 295-299
& accompanying text supra.
314. For example, in Wisconsin NOW v. Wisconsin, 417 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Wis. 1976),
the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin refused to find dis-
criminatory a merit plan that clearly had a disparate effect on women under the test of
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), because the merit pay plan itself did not
have the effect of excluding any class of persons from employment opportunities. The court
found that "the complaint does not allege any discriminatory practice, act, or effect" in the
defendant's hiring, training, or promotion practices. 417 F. Supp. at 982. "[R]ather it alleges
numerous ways in which the merit plan has a discriminatory impact on women and minori-
ties." Id. "[A]n allegation of racial and sexual imbalance is [in]sufficient to state a claim for
relief from discriminatory hiring and promotional practices in the absence of any allegation
that plaintiff ... was in some way discriminated against with regard to hiring and promo-
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flects a desire common throughout the United States to preserve
the free market system wherein the laws of supply and demand
regulate wages. A broad decision, as in Gunther, although moti-
vated by the admirable aim to eliminate all sex-based wage differ-
entials, would impinge on the free market system. The lack of
standards for evaluating wage discrimination prohibited by Title
VII would necessitate an evaluation of employment practices that
stretches far beyond the bounds of judicial prerogative or exper-
tise. The courts have never encouraged such a massive intrusion
into the sphere of private decisionmaking. 315 The New York law
firm of Epstein, Becker, Barsody and Green expressed the con-
cerns of business and labor about the "comparable worth"
doctrine:
Moreover implementation would necessitate a massive intrusion
and interference with collective bargaining relationships in dero-
gation of long-established and well-supported principles of Fed-
eral labor law. Fundamental supply and demand market mecha-
nisms thus would be eliminated from their traditional role in
determining wages, in favor of the utilization of a single, grossly
subjective factor, the supposed current worth of the job to the
employer.3
16
tion." Id. at 982-83. The court apparently felt that because discrimination in hiring was not
alleged, women had the option of transferring into the higher-paying positions. In Patterson
v. American Tobacco Co., 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6003 (E.D. Va. 1974), the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Virginia declined to consider an argument that wo-
men's jobs were being undervalued and instead focused upon permitting women to transfer
into men's jobs. The court indicated its reluctance to explore economic valuations of job
classifications. Id. at 6006.
315. [This] is a [comparable work] case which is pregnant with the possibility of
disrupting the entire economic system of the United States of America.
. .. [W]hat he is saying is that I should open the Pandora's box in this case
of restructuring the entire economy of the United States of America.
* . .Neither the Congress of the United States nor the United States Su-
preme Court ... want Judges to run the country in that fashion.
Lemons v. City & County of Denver, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 906, 906-09 (D. Colo. 1978),
aff'd, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 959 (10th Cir. 1980).
316. DAnLY LAn. REP. (BNA) No. 4, at A-8 (Jan. 7, 1980).
An "equal pay for comparable work" policy addresses wage differences between occupa-
tions. Rather than requiring employers to pay equal wages to men and women competing in
the same market, the comparable work standard establishes a common price in two unre-
lated markets. Implicitly, the doctrine rests on the "crowding" view of discrimination: wo-
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The Third Circuit's decision in IUE has provided a workable
compromise: broaden the attack on sex discrimination within the
limits of our economic system by allowing claims of unequal pay
for comparable work only if accompanied by proof of intentional
discrimination. Undoubtedly, at some point the plaintiff still must
establish the comparable nature of her work, and over time, courts
will be forced, with the aid of experts, to deal with economic valua-
tions. Nevertheless, the Third Circuit's solution narrows the class
of plaintiffs. Moreover, the equal protection of females and minori-
ties contemplated by the language and legislative intent 1 7 behind
Title VII demand this judicial foray into heretofore uncharted
areas.
CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit in Gunther and the Third Circuit in IUE
were the first courts of appeals to attempt exhaustively and analyt-
ically to delineate the heretofore ambiguous relationship between
Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. The judicial task they faced was
essentially a matter of statutory construction, but their decisions
have serious implications for the future of labor decisionmaking.
men's pay in certain occupations is low primarily because women cannot move into other
jobs offering higher wages and better advancement possibilities. See Cohen, Sex Differences
in Compensation, 6 J. OF HUMAN RESOURcES 437 (1971); Oaxaca, Male - Female Wage Dif-
ferentials in Urban Labor Markets, 14 INT'L ECON. REV. 693 (1973).
Advocates of "equal pay for comparable work" argue that differentials result solely from
discrimination; hence the removal of wage differentials will erase the effects of prejudice.
Yet wage differentials commonly reflect much more than the effects of prejudice. Wage dif-
ferentials guide labor toward occupations and geographic locations where labor is in short
supply, and discourage labor from entering occupations containing excessive labor resources.
Clearly the laws of supply and demand govern entry into labor markets and wage rates in
labor markets. Moreover, wage rates are influenced by the cost of acquiring skills, the vary-
ing productivity of classes of workers, and simply the attractiveness of certain careers and
locations. A vast variety of variables influence the setting of wage rates. See C. LINDSAY,
EQUAL PAY FOR COMPARABLE WORK (1980).
Ideally, the appropriate wage in any occupation exists in the absence of discrimination:
teachers' wages may have trended downward by "crowding" into this occupation, but the
extent of the depression is unknowable. Teachers may earn less than electricians because
teachers' work is more "pleasant," requires more supervision or less skill, or simply because
electricians are in shorter supply. Thus mere identification of wage disparities between dif-
ferent jobs does not prove discrimination. See Malkiel & Malkiel, Male-Female Pay Differ-
entials in Professional Employment, 63 Avmm ECON. REv. 693 (1973).
317. See notes 193-209 & accompanying text supra.
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The pathbreaking decision in Gunther failed to recognize the
dangers inherent in an embrace of an open-ended interpretation of
the Bennett Amendment. Although sex-based wage discrimination
cannot be justified, its elimination must be achieved through prac-
tical solutions. The Ninth Circuit's solution in Gunther was admi-
rable, but unworkable. Therefore, a much needed narrower deci-
sion of the Third Circuit in IUE has enabled the courts to fulfill
the antidiscrimination intentions of congressional initiatives with-
out totally disrupting the American economy.
FAITH D. RUDERFER
